SELECTED HEINRICH GOMPERZ'S MANUSCRIPTS
IN THE HOOSE LIBRARY

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The "Gomperz Collection" in U.S.C.'s Hoose Library is well known for its rare, first, early, and otherwise distinguished editions, valuable to both antiquarians and scholars. Heinrich Gomperz, for whom this collection is named, not only built up one of the finest private philosophy libraries in the world, but also built up a large collection of other scholarly materials. In the spring of 1970, through the timely efforts of Mr. Wallace Nethery, Head Librarian of the Hoose Library, and Professors Kevin Robb and Dallas Willard of the School of Philosophy of U.S.C., a sizeable group of these materials was purchased for the library from Mrs. Phillip Merlan, widow of the distinguished classical scholar. These materials are of four basic types: (1) manuscripts of technical articles; (2) notes for public lectures; (3) notes for class lectures; (4) published German dissertations and inaugural addresses by other professors. With generous assistance from Professor Kevin Robb, I have undertaken the task of editing some of these papers.
I have examined only those materials written in English, and have included here only a representative sample of those which seemed to make significant contributions to the history of scholarship in philosophy or offered insights into Gomperz' life or works. I have classified the included materials into three categories: (1) studies in Greek philosophy; (2) studies in moral, political, or social philosophy, which I have entitled "Essays on Contemporary Problems," (3) two brief items of a moral personal nature. In one of these latter pieces, "The Spiritual Climate of Vienna," Gomperz gives his impressions of the city in which he lived, and in "What I Do Not Believe" he lists those philosophical positions which he could not accept.

For the technical articles and the selected public lectures and class notes, my first consideration has been to establish a coherent text. In the case of the type-written materials, this task was routine. Many of the manuscript materials, however, are in outline form or otherwise in varying degrees of completeness. Most are in Gomperz' handwriting, sometimes difficult to read. Those words or parts of words which I have added to restore the meaning or the fluidity of the text are underlined. Where a restoration is doubtful, I have put a question mark, enclosed in slashes, after it. In some cases I have suggested alternative readings, noted in the same way.
None of the materials included in this thesis has been published. After Gomperz' death in 1942, Dr. Daniel S. Robinson, then Director of the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California, gathered several of the unpublished technical articles and public lecture notes, along with a number of published journal articles, into the book *Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz*. While this book was extremely valuable in rescuing many of the unpublished technical treatises and public lectures from oblivion, and for assuring scholars readier access to his journal articles, it did not include all the Gomperz papers. Other materials in the Hoose Library include the unpublished manuscripts for the second and third volumes of Gomperz' book on his father, Theodor Gomperz: *Brief und Aufzeichnungen ausgewählt, erläutert und zu einer Darstellung Seines Lebens Verknüpft*. And in Doheny Library's Special Collections Department there is a group of unpublished letters, many from famous philosophical figures such as John Stuart Mill, some written to Heinrich and some to Theodor Gomperz. These letters date from 1854 to 1939. At least one of Heinrich Gomperz' unpublished papers, on Rudolf Carnap, remains in private hands.

The life story of Heinrich Gomperz is fascinating. He was born in Vienna in 1873 and lived in Austria until age 62. Though his family was of Jewish extraction, he was strongly attached to his Germanic background. As he
put it, "Zionism appeared to us a crazy idea. We were brought up Germans, and I myself considered myself a German." His warm appreciation of German culture is evident in his lecture "The Spiritual Climate of Vienna," which I have included in this study.

Not often was he so partial. With one brief exception, he never joined a political party. And he disclaimed membership in any "school" of philosophy. When he entered the University of Vienna after graduation from high school in 1891, he chose to study law, at which time he decided that "I was capable of a high, perhaps of an unusually high, degree of detached impartiality." This was not an idle claim. Shortly after he had been hounded out of Nazi Austria, he delivered an address on the subject "Racialism and Philosophy." One could hardly hope for objectivity on this topic from a Jewish scholar whose reward for a distinguished academic career, which for 40 years added luster to German scholarship, was a summary and thankless uprooting in his old age, and confiscation of his library. But there is no trace of emotional reaction in the address which he delivered to the annual meeting of the U.S.C. Alumni Association on May 1, 1936. He pledges to "approach the subject with an unbiased mind, in an attitude of analysis and research"--and so he does. He analyzes the historical basis for Nazi racist beliefs, and relates this historical development to
the findings of modern science.

In 1893 Gomperz abandoned law for Ecclesiastical History, which he studied under Adolf Harnack at Berlin. Since Gomperz considered himself an agnostic, in later years he never could account for his interest in Ecclesiastical History except to say that it fascinated him. Perhaps this subject was attractive to him because the ecclesiastics regarded the universe as wonderful—as Gomperz himself did. He rejected Neo-positivism, otherwise congenial to his dislike of emotive, partial statements, because the positivists did not see the universe as wonderful.

Upon his return to Vienna, he studied some history and philosophy before taking his Ph.D. degree in philosophy in 1896. While doing his graduate work at Vienna, he met such distinguished men as Alfred Berger, Franz Brentano, A. Meinong, Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Paulsen, and Ernst Mach. Berger and Mach were the two who influenced Gomperz the most. Gomperz admits that he was "stimulated" by "the moral and religious agnosticism" of Berger and that Mach was "the most original and penetrating thinker with whom it has been my privilege to associate." Mach appeared to him to be "the incarnation of the scientific spirit."7

These influences were minor, however, compared to the impact of his father, Theodor. Theodor Gomperz was
one of the distinguished scholars of Greek philosophy in
the nineteenth century. He was universally lauded for his
reconstructions of Epicurean texts, many inscribed on rolls
of badly mutilated papyrus. And his *Griechische Denker*
was considered a monumental work of scholarship. Heinrich
was influenced by his father in both positive and negative
ways. He readily credits his father for the "intellectual
thoroughness and honesty that gives serious thought to
every argument and never rests satisfied with any reason
or any result just because it is convenient and fits into
a preconceived pattern." But he differs with his father
over major issues in Greek philosophy. Heinrich in
particular rejects Theodor's thesis that the Utilitarianism
of Bentham and Mill was foreshadowed by Socrates and Plato.
In the cameo piece "The Philosophy of Heraclitus," he
strongly disagrees with those who read their own ideas into
the Presocratics, and he specifically mentions his father
as one who does read in his own ideas. It was Theodor's
training and care to instill a respect for scholarly
values, however, which helped Heinrich to develop into a
scholar.

For a time, it did not look as though Heinrich
would follow in his father's footsteps. Thinking that his
son should know a trade, Theodor apprenticed Heinrich to
a carpenter. One day, meeting his son coming down the road
with a load of wood, it must have struck the elder man that
the boy would be more at home carrying books. He immediately ended the apprenticeship and began training him to be a scholar.

In 1899 Gomperz offered himself as a subject analysis for a most interesting experiment. The experiment was on analysis of Gomperz' dreams by his old acquaintance Sigmund Freud, whose *Interpretation of Dreams* had just appeared. Freud could not make an interpretation of Gomperz' dreams, however. He later told a colleague that Gomperz was one of only two men whose dreams he had been unable to analyze.

From 1900 to 1903 Gomperz served as an unpaid lecturer at the University of Bern, Switzerland. In 1905 he returned to the University of Vienna, where he was appointed Associate Professor in 1920 and Professor in 1924. For ten years, Gomperz was able to enjoy his well-earned academic status. But in September, 1934, he was prematurely retired from his position and given an inadequate pension for resisting Chancellor Dollfus' "irresistable popular front." This incident is striking evidence of Gomperz' courage. Not every man, particularly of Jewish descent, would feel able to defy a Nazi government. His courage was in evidence later as well, when he gave his "Racialism and Philosophy" lecture in America. He drew a parallel between Germany's racial policies towards Jews and America's racial attitudes towards
Negroes. For a man who had so recently run afoul of his native land's racial policies to criticize his adopted country's policies must indeed have taken courage.

Through F. C. S. Schiller, in 1935 Gomperz was invited to come to the University of Southern California as a Visiting Professor of Philosophy. From 1936 until his death in 1942 he was a permanent member of the faculty.

The story of Gomperz' library sounds as though it came directly from a spy thriller. Building the library was an unexciting enough process. It was begun by Theodor, who amassed a sizeable collection of books. When Theodor's library was sold in Vienna, there were 5631 numbers in the catalogue (which means, of course, that there were many more volumes).

Precisely how many of the volumes in Theodor's collection were not sold, but were willed to Heinrich after Theodor's death in 1912, is not known. Gomperz' wife Ada was certain that some volumes (while not a very large percent of Heinrich's library, some of the more interesting items) were derived in this way. Flewelling, however, reported Gomperz' unequivocal denial that any of the books had come from his father.

In any case, there is no doubt that Heinrich Gomperz was a confirmed bibliophile. He started to buy books when he became a Privatdozent at the University of Bern in 1900. In 1908, three years after his return to
Vienna, he had to rent the apartment adjoining his own to provide shelf space for his rapidly growing collection of books. He now had 2200 square feet of floor space. Even though the height of the rooms was eleven feet, it was not long before all the rooms were filled, floor to ceiling, with book shelves.

During and after World War I, when so many privately-owned European libraries had to be sold, Gomperz acquired many rare volumes. Often, too, he was able to keep his collection updated by obtaining newer editions of books which he already owned. At its peak, the library contained more than eighteen thousand volumes. In 1937, Gomperz sold some 3200 volumes to the University of Southern California.

In 1938, the property of all Viennese Jews was confiscated by the government. This of course included the Gomperz Library. Before the confiscation could be effected, however, two important steps were taken to keep the library from the Nazis. (1) Five to six thousand volumes were given away or sold in Vienna. None of these were philosophical works. Subject matter included German literature, Austrian and Viennese history, European art, psychoanalysis and medicine, and music (including the scores of many classical compositions). Maria Zöhrer, Gomperz' one-time secretary, arranged for the books to be spirited away to the basement of a building a few blocks
This was done none too soon. Hitler had been informed of the fabulous Gomperz library, and had decided that he wanted the collection for himself. During the war, the building containing the books was bombed. But the books, packed in 85 crates taking up as much space as a three-story building, were unharmed.

When news of the confiscation had reached Gomperz, he signed over the library to the University of Southern California. The university, in turn, spoke to the State Department. The U.S. ambassador in Vienna warned the Nazis not to seize the library, which was now American property. After the war, the Mayor of Vienna (who had known the secret hiding place) revealed the hiding place of the books to the U.S. Army. The University, when notified, stated that Gomperz' signing of the books over to it was merely a "gentlemen's agreement" to protect the collection, valued at more than $40,000. So, in 1948, the university purchased 8363 bound volumes and more than 1000 pamphlets. These materials, plus the 3200 purchased in 1937, constitute the University of Southern California's famous "Gomperz Collection."

Gomperz' great talents as a scholar and book collector were supplemented by his remarkable abilities as a teacher. His capacious memory must have served him well. He seemed able at will to repeat verbatim any portion of
Plato in original Greek, or in German or English translation.\textsuperscript{11} Another of his U.S.C. colleagues, Dr. Wilburn Long, has emphasized his remarkable ability to write and speak both lucidly and simply. A particularly striking example is his lecture "Why Was Plato Great?" He captures and retains the reader's attention with highly informative, yet perfectly clear and flowing prose. Certainly Gomperz was fortunate to have had an English governess to teach him the language when he was a small child. But it is to his own superior talents that his lecture audiences owed the fine presentations which they heard and to which we are indebted for the beautifully written manuscripts which we now have. And, to temper the fine mind and superb presentation of his thoughts, Gomperz was not without a sense of humor. When his wife was trying, not very successfully, to learn to drive a car, Gomperz was scheduled to deliver a series of public lectures. At one of these he announced that he had arrived by streetcar, since if he had come by car he could not be at all sure he would have arrived.

With such vast and varied talents, Gomperz' audiences and readers were treated to great substance presented in a winning manner. This study presents selections from the recently acquired Gomperz manuscripts which exhibit these qualities, and which at the same time add significant contributions to important issues in
either the problems or the history of philosophy.
Notes


3 For Heinrich Gomperz' own account, see the "Autobiographical Remarks" in Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz.

4 Robinson, p. 16.

5 He even disclaimed identification with logical empiricism, though Carnap counted him a member of his "Vienna Circle" of logical empiricists. The influence of Carnap and his circle, however, remained strong throughout Gomperz' career.


8 Robinson, p. 19.

9 This information comes from a personal letter from Mrs. Gomperz to Mrs. Florence Smith of the U.S.C. Department of Philosophy, written on November 13, 1949.

10 Contained in a typed sheet of introductory remarks prepared by Professor Flewelling, and now in the Hoose Library.

11 Lloyd Arvidson, "Heinrich Gomperz," The Library Bulletin [University of Southern California], No. 7 (September, 1950), no pagin.
CHAPTER II

While the story of Heinrich Gomperz and his famous library is an intriguing one, it is his remaining manuscripts that we are most concerned with here. In this chapter are six manuscripts dealing with Greek philosophy: "Philosophy of Heraclitus," "Why Was Plato Great," "Did Plato Believe in Creation," "Evolutionary Conceptions in Presocratic Philosophy," a translation of Parmenides' poem, and "Remarks on Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound."

Introduction of "The Philosophy of Heraclitus"

The "Philosophy of Heraclitus" is presented first, in recognition of Heinrich Gomperz' single greatest contribution to scholarship in Presocratic philosophy—the pioneering interpretation that Heraclitus was not a proponent of the Universe as flux, which at the time was the universally accepted belief. Rather, as Gomperz showed, Heraclitus taught that the universe was a unified whole. His theory implied that its fluctuating, seemingly conflicting aspects were opposites only superficially, which could be reconciled into a conceptual oneness, not contraries unalterably opposed to one another.
Gomperz' translation of the fragments included in this article are original, and reflects his interpretation of Heraclitus. All the fragments are concerned with the idea of wisdom, and particularly with the one wisdom that "steers all things at all times." The remarks that "This order of things, the same for all . . .," "For those awake the order of things is one and the same, but of those asleep each one turns aside into an order of his own" and "But although the truth is the same (for all), men live as if each one had a thinking power of his own" are particularly impressive support for his interpretation of Heraclitus.

The "Introductory Remarks" and the "Concluding Remarks" would at first seem an indication that the article was long enough to require both an introduction and a conclusion. This would mean that the present three-page manuscript is incomplete. While this is possible, my guess is that the current manuscript is a complete cameo piece. The "Introductory Remarks" are certainly complete, because the translation of one fragment follows on the same page. We can safely assume that the "Concluding Remarks" are also complete, since the final sentence of the manuscript is decidedly a terminal one: "True, Heracliteanism, then . . . ."

In any case, both the "Introductory Remarks" and the "Concluding Remarks" are worthwhile. The "Introductory
Remarks" are especially valuable as a caution against recreating Heraclitus in one's own philosophical image--even if the recreator is one's own father. The "Concluding Remarks" forcefully underscore the evidence for the interpretation of Heraclitus as proponent of unity, not flux. Because they are in summary form, they remind the reader of the many evidences, discussed elsewhere in detail, that point to Gomperz' interpretation.

I have included three pages, most likely not part of the "Philosophy of Heraclitus," but which illuminate fragments 58 and 67 with this same interpretation. For his remarks about fragments 31 and 126A, Gomperz drew upon his interest in science, both ancient and modern. This familiarity with science enabled him to comprehend fully both the phenomena which Heraclitus observed and to know how Heraclitus would have understood them, thus enabling him to supply the theories behind Heraclitus' two cryptic remarks.

Philosophy of Heraclitus

Introductory Remarks

It is as unfortunate as it is natural that the thinkers of every age supposed the philosophy of Heraclitus to have been concerned mainly with those problems which they themselves happened to deem most fundamental. Plato fancied that he had emphasized Becoming as against Being;
Aristotle that he had denied the principle of contradiction; the Stoics that he had proclaimed divine Reason as the supreme principle of the universe; Hippolytus that he had inspired the heresy of Noetus; Lassalle that he had anticipated Hegel's dialectics, and my late father, Theodor Gomperz, that he had discovered the laws of causality and relativity. All this is rather phantastic and we may be pretty sure that Heraclitus himself would have regarded it as the gibberish of barbarians, destitute of understanding.

It is a restricted number rather of philologists than of philosophers who have urged us on toward an unbiased interpretation of the authentic relics of Heraclitus' book. Schleiermacher, with admirable tact and instinct, first collected its fragments, weeded out later forgeries and endeavoured to make sense of his philosophy. Bywater and Diels established the text of what is left of his book. Patin pointed out that Heraclitus himself had indicated what he conceived his chief contribution to have been. Reinhardt showed that, in order to understand the philosopher, we must as far as possible abstract from the interpretations of the ancients, and start from his own words. I have myself tried to apply this principle to a certain number of fragments. And recently Gigon has endeavoured to review them all. I propose here to give a summary of what the result of these endeavours would seem to be.
Frg. 108 D.

Of all whose discourse I heard not one attains to the knowledge of wisdom (as being) distinct from every other thing.

Fragment 30.41

Knowledge of many things does not teach to have understanding. Otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras and again Xenophanes and Hekareus. For (to have understanding) means to be aware of one thing: wisdom, the intelligence that steers all things at all times.

Fragment 32.

One only is wise. It does not claim and (yet) does claim to be called by the name of Zeus.

Fragment 50.

'Tis fair to admit that the One that's wise knows all.

Fragment 30.31

This order of things, the same for all, was not made by any God nor by any man, but ever was and is and will be: ever living heat blazing forth according to measure.—Heat turns: first into sea, then sea
halp into earth and
half into flame.

**Fragment 89.**

For those awake the
order of things is one
and the same, but of
those asleep each one
turns aside into an order
of his own.

**Fragment 113.**

But although truth is
the same (for all), men
live as if each one had
a thinking power of his
own.

**Concluding Remarks**

To sum up, wisdom, according to Heraclitus, mani-

dests itself by the realisation of a world-scheme; nature

throughout reveals a symmetrical structure, it consists of

opposites, prevailing alternately according to fixed

"measures." In other words, polarity and rhythm are the

fundamental characteristics of the universe. That seems
to be the true upshot of Heraclitus' philosophy.

Can such a philosophy mean anything to us, or is

it clearly and definitely obsolete? Polarity was a

favorite concept with Goethe and Schelling. Modern science
does not appear to both very much about it, nor about

rhythm either. Is it because these concepts have turned

out to lack a real meaning? Hardly. Day and night, summer
and winter, waking and sleep, youth and old age, life and death are there as they have always been. Have they at least been reduced to other, more grand /¿/ and recondite phenomena? Perhaps it might be contended that they are simply symptoms and manifestations of life, to which growth and decay, aggression and defence, pursuit and shunning, seem to be essential. But do they not extend to the inorganic as well? Perhaps in some instances contrast is only apparent and due merely to the apprehension of the living. Warm and Cold seem to be opposites, but in truth they are simply different intensities of molecular motion, and it is only when compared with a medium intensity that they appear to be opposites. But what about positive and negative electricity and about the rhythm of lightwaves? And does not even the quantum theory imply an element of rhythm?

True Heracliteanism, then, would seem to be at least as fertile and suggestive as the pseudo Heracliteanism of the textbooks, and it might, after all, be more advisable to try to answer the questions he really asked than to suppose that he asked but questions which we fancy we are able to answer.

61. Frgs. 9 and 37.
62. Frgs. 82, 83 and 79.
63. Frgs. 103 and 59.
64. Frg. 60.
65. Frgs. 49a and 12.

66. οι ρουν Ιατροί, θησιν δε, ημίοντες και ούτες πάλης, βασαλίσκοντες και όμως τούς αρρωστούντας, επαιτεώντας μηδεν αξίων μισθόν λαμβάνειν παρά των αρρωστούντων, ταυτα έργα ας μενολ
(Frg. 58).

This is the reading of the manuscript and there is no cogent reason for departing from it. Evidently, if the surgeons hold the payment they mostly receive to be inadequate, they must be convinced that, by illtreating the patient, they have, at the same time, conferred a great boon upon him - which is exactly what had to be proved. If, however, we alter one letter (reading δειον for δειον ) and, moreover, suppose ἐπαιτεώταλ to be used as a passive form, we get a simpler and therefore still more satisfactory meaning: "... yet are not rebuked and (even) held to deserve payment ..."

(ἐπαιτεώταλ μηδεν δειον μισθον λαμβανειν.) Ulterior alterations that have been proposed and generally accepted and make the author say that the surgeons do not deserve payment (μηδεν δειον μισθον λαμβανειν ) appear to be absurd since this would disapprove what ought to be proved, namely that their treatment is at the same time an evil and a good. Comp. Oesterr. Zeitschrift f. oesterr. Gymnasien 1910, S. 970.

67. διήνα θνομα ουκ αν κεδεσαν, (or rather δεισαν which is newer. The manuscript reading ζεισαν) ει ταυτα μη ην.
(Frg. 23).

68. νοοσος ανελευναι ἐποίησαν ηνυ, και άγαθων, λιμος κόρον, καταρας ανάπαυσιν. (Frg. 111).

69. ο θεὸς ημερή ευφρονι, κελμων θεός, πολέμως ελημυν, κόρος λιμος δ ήξηλευτετ δε δηκτερ δικον ευμακας και θυσιν εκάστου . (Frg. 67).

After δηκτερ the word τυρ is now mostly inserted. It is doubtful whether that is indispensable, for, to Heraclitus, God and Fire ultimately meant the same and even ἑξηλευτετ ("is differentiated") could hardly be predicated of God in the strict sense of the term. But it is more important to determine the precise meaning of the simile. It is usually supposed that the philosopher is referring to the fact that fire, or rather smoke, is designated differently according to the kind of incense burned and hence the words και θυσιν εκάστου are assumed to mean: according to the odor of each kind (although there is no other instance of
"ονν" being used in the sense of scent instead of in that of flavor. But it is not easy to understand how, if this were correct, the simile could apply to the cosmos. The incense is different from and independent of the fire; hence, it makes sense to say that the latter is designated by different names according to the different kinds of the former. But what is there, according to Heraclitus, in the universe different from and independent of God? Therefore, it would seem more likely that he had in mind the case of fire consuming different kinds of incense at one and the same time. In this case, he would then have meant to say, it is arbitrary by which of the corresponding names to designate the fire: each of them may be used "according to each man's pleasure," (καθ' ονν ἔκαστον). And in the same way we may apply to God the names Day or Night; Winter or Summer; War or Peace; Satiety or Hunger "as we please:" all are equally justified because, after all, there is no real difference in God corresponding to this difference of names.

70. Ὁ οὗτος ἐν ζῷῳ καὶ τεθνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐγκαταδρόμῳ καὶ νεόν καὶ νηράσιν τὰς μέρας μετατερμάτω τετίνα στὴ ἀκόντα μετάκτων εἴσθ. (Frg. 88).

71. τὰ ψυχρὰ εἴρηται, εἰρήμον ψύχεται, βρόχον αὐθέρεται, καιρολέον γοτήρεται. (Frg. 126).

72. -- ἀδικάτοι ὄντες, οὐντοὶ ἄδικοι, ζῶντες δὲν ἐκείνων εὖν ἁγιᾶν, ἐν δὲ ἐκείνων μὲν τετελεῖτες. (Frg. 62).

73. . . . ἔστι γὰρ ἐν . (Frg. 57).

74. Frg. 30. Comp. note 26 above.

75. . . . ἀπόψευμον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεμμένον μέτρα. (Frg. 30).

76. ἔστι γὰρ εἰμαρμένα πάντως . (Frg. 137).

That the term occurred in a discussion of μέτρα appears from Aetius (Heraclitus A 8 Diels). Nor is there any reason to suspect the authenticity of the quotation. εἰμαρμένα is the manuscript reading in Aeschylus, Agamemnon 912. That it was not arbitrarily inserted by a Stoic author is shown by the consensus of pre-Stoic evidence (Diogenes Laertius IX 8; Heraclitus A 5 and A 8 Diels; comp. Hermes 58, 3.51). And Kranz' argument that "there are no quotations from Heraclitus in Aetius" (who quotes the sentence) is a
curious one, since here we have such a quotation (γράφειν γνῦν'). A unique phenomenon must never be denied just because it is unique.

77. According to Frg. 126a Seven "is divided" among the Great and the lesser Bear (each consisting of 7 stars), but may also be "figured out" with respect to the moon "according to the ratio of periods" (κατὰ λόγον δὲ ωρῶν συμβάλλεται ἐπισομάς κατὰ σελήνην, διαρκετά δὲ κατὰ χαὶ δρόμους...). How did he "figure" that "out?" The lunar period covers 30 days. Now, we learn that Heraclitus (A 19 Diels) determined a "generation" as consisting of 30 years, using the curious argument that within such a period a man might become a grandfather, or rather, as he is said to have expressed himself, might "complete a circle of generation" inasmuch as his son might possibly in his turn become a father. And this argument he developed by pointing out that a man might beget a son at the age of 14 so that he would be 15 when the son was born, and it would then take this son another 15 years to become a father. Hence, the 30 years of a generation are "figured out" to be equal to 2. (2.7/1). Now, applying this strange calculus to the moon Heraclitus probably "figured out" that the 30 days of her period were equal to 2.7 days of waxing, 1 day for the full moon and 2.7 days of waning 1 day for the new moon, so that the "ratio of periods" may here too be expressed by the formula 30 = 2.7(2.7/1). Moreover, Heraclitus also ascribed cosmic significance to an astronomical period, by many termed the "Great year" which he supposed to consist of 10 800 solar years which means, after all, that it would comprise 360 months (or periods of 30 days each), just as the solar year comprises 360 days.

78. ... ἡμέρας δὲ τῷ μὴ ἡμίου γῆς, τὸ δὲ ἡμίου παρθένι... ἡμέρας διακόπτεται καὶ μετρεῖται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡσοῦ τρισάθεν ἤ ἡ γενέσιν γῆ... (Frg. 31). Why should just half the ocean be turned to earth? Perhaps for no other reason than that evaporation had also to be accounted for and that both processes appeared to be equally significant.

79. ὁ λογος οὗ ὑπερβλέπεται μέγα. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἑρμίνες μὲν ἀληθείας ἐπίκεισθαι εἰς ἑξεργασίαν (Frg. 94).

80. ... ὧρας σαφὰ δέραντο (Frg. 100).

81. Amply discussed by the writer Wiener Studien 43, S.115 sq.
Introduction to "Why Was Plato Great?"

The old proverb that one is often unable to see the forest for the trees must occur at one time or another to anyone who does extensive scholarship in a technical field. So often one's conceptual perspective is obscured by a torrent of specialized data. As a counterweight to the necessarily narrow nature of scholarship, it is helpful to have an expert in the field occasionally step back to make a broader assessment. For the prose of Plato, we are fortunate enough to have the analysis of Heinrich Gomperz.

This analysis is the text of an address delivered to a dinner meeting of the U.S.C. Latin Department on May 28, 1936. We are extremely fortunate that this manuscript, like the preceding one on the "Philosophy of Heraclitus," was left us in final, typewritten form. As a result, we lose none of the beautiful prose which Gomperz composed. The style is engaging, and eminently readable because of its simple yet efficient lucidity. The presentation is informative without being stuffy, and simple without being condescending. In his charming introduction to Socrates, for instance, notice how much ground Gomperz covers without having to strain:

And in the midst of all these and of many others, towering above them all, there is the central figure, Socrates, always recurring, yet never quite the same, so familiar to the reader, yet always somewhat myster-
ious, with his thirst of knowing never to be quenched, with his criticism never to be blunted, with his irony now friendly and encouraging, now scathing and rebutting, Socrates, always open to every argument, yet never shaken in conviction, ever changing in his aspect as the surface of the ocean, yet never flickering in his eagerness nor wavering in his determination.

Still more impressively, Gomperz manages to sketch the cultural context of Plato's thought. He is generous with interesting elaboration, yet never digressive:

If the great orators introduce us to the political and business-life of Athens, with all the intrigues, scandals, and crimes to which it gave rise, and if in the comedies of Aristophanes the weaknesses and eccentricities of the Athenians and indeed, of all mankind, are caricatured by the pencil of a great master, it is the dialogues of Plato that mirror the spiritual life of wellbred Attic citizens; we feel wherein they were interested, we see them meeting and conversing in the streets or outside the city-wall, or sitting side by side in the gymnasium or at the banquet-table, and that unparalleled compound of courtesy and irony that was, I should say, the most characteristic feature of their conversation still resounds to our ears, because it has, with unrivalled skill, been echoed by Plato.

Gomperz weights content along with form; he gives the dialectical, the pedagogical, and the visionary elements their rightful places in his evaluation.

**Why Was Plato Great?**

The great figures of history tend to dwindle down to unmeaning names, to those who lack the opportunity as well as the motive for special study. It seems reasonable therefore to try, again and again, to attach to these names at least some vague and insufficient meaning. It is one of these menial services that I propose today to render to
the great name of Plato.

Plato who lived at Athens in the fourth century B.C. and who, although descending from an old and noble family, forsook the political career that seemed to open before him, gave himself up entirely to speculation and founded a school of philosophy and general culture, namely the Academy, - a school which, although changing its inspiration again and again, yet continued to exist and to flourish for a thousand years, and which even down to our own time has transmitted its name to innumerable pedants as well as to countless eager students.

Plato has always, and, I think, justly, been considered as one of the greatest thinkers and teachers and, moreover, as one of the greatest writers of all times. Now, let us suppose that your interest in the matter went at least as far as to suggest to you the question why I feel warranted to endorse that estimate. For that is precisely the question that I shall now attempt to answer.

Plato was undoubtedly one of the greatest, and I suppose I might even say the greatest, of Greek prose-writers. His works are, indeed, the main source of our knowledge of Athenian culture. If the great orators introduce us to the political and business-life of Athens, with all the intrigues, scandals and crimes to which it gave rise, and if in the comedies of Aristophanes the weaknesses and eccentricities of the Athenians and, indeed,
of mankind, are caricatured by the pencil of a great master, it is the dialogues of Plato that mirror the spiritual life of wellbred Attic citizens: we feel wherein they were interested, we see them meeting and conversing in the streets or outside the city-wall, or sitting side by side in the gymnasion or at the banquet-table, and that unparalleled compound of courtesy and irony that was, I should say, the most characteristic feature of their conversation still resounds to our ears, because it has, with unrivalled skill, been echoed by Plato. When these citizens met they discussed their own affairs as also those of their neighbors and of the city; they admired the beauty of the young, and were, at the same time, seriously solicitous about their future efficiency; and they amused each other by forcing artificial interpretations on passages, quoted from memory, of the most illustrious poets. Yet, alike as they might, in these respects, be, individual differences were not lacking, and Plato, if he was a master in rendering the spirit pervading Athenian society as a whole, was certainly no less a master in the delineation of individual characters.

With indelible strokes he has portrayed the Pharisee who feels so sure of his ritualistic scholarship that he does not hesitate to denounce his own father to the authorities; the glib rhetorician ready to display his art in speaking on any question that may be raised and
thereby, so he believes, settling it once for all; and the pedant whose favorite theme is the distinction of synonyms and who can not open his mouth without pointing out the precise meaning of some term. In the *Rivals*, a little dialogue that has often been considered as spurious, we listen to a conversation between two men that might as well take place today: one being all for sport, and the other all for culture. In the *Banquet* we witness young Alcibiades, reckless but enthusiastic, speaking out what none else would dare to avow; and, again, in the *Republic* old Cephalus glorying that his passions have cooled down and that he is now beyond temptation. And in the midst of all these and of many others, towering above them all, there is the central figure, Socrates, always recurring, yet never quite the same, so familiar to the reader, yet always somewhat mysterious, with his thirst of knowing never to be quenched, with his criticism never to be blunted, with his irony now friendly and encouraging, now scathing and rebutting, Socrates, always open to every argument, yet never shaken in his conviction, ever changing in his aspect as the surface of the ocean, yet never flickering in his eagerness, nor wavering in his determination.

And Plato's style varies with the topic discussed and with the speakers that discuss it. It can be dry and precise in dialectical argument; as a rule it conforms to
the standard of refined simplicity, and is pervaded by a fine humor and occasionally illuminated by poignant wit. Often, it expresses the earnestness of moral conviction. At times it rises to the level of visionary inspiration and shines in a glow of enthusiasm. As the author grows old, his style becomes, indeed, more and more involved, but just at this stage it here and there breaks out into a tone of oracular solemnity and prophetic majesty never attained to before.

But Plato's dialogues would not be the perfect works of art they are, if all these different types of matter, man and manner were not blended with the most refined feeling for measure, balance and proportion. Indeed, where Plato's art was allowed fully to develop, the effect achieved is very similar to that of symphonic music. This is, perhaps, most conspicuous in the Banquet. The guests agree to praise love. The speech of Phaedrus is rather commonplace. Pausanias celebrates love of the soul, as contrasted with mere love of the body. Eryximachus expands the field of vision and points to love or attraction as one of the great cosmic forces. Aristophanes, in a fanciful myth, interprets love as a symbol of prenatal familiarity. Agathon, with all the devices of rhetoric, exalts love as if it were always a boon. Then Socrates rebukes him. Love is not good in itself. It is rather a craving for the Good, or, to speak
more precisely, for the Beautiful, it is the will to engender in the Beautiful, to perpetuate self by offspring or by memorable deeds, it is a form of the desire for immortality. Love of the body is its lowest form; love of soul is higher; but love of fame and truth, and of everything noble and beautiful is higher still, and the only perfect love is that of beauty itself, namely of its eternal and changless essence. At this point Alcibiades enters, drunk and followed by a train of revelling friends. But in his very drunkenness he speaks out what his own personal experience has been and points out Socrates as the only perfect lover, since he alone knows how to love the soul, free from all selfishness, and how to overcome all carnal desire.

But, of course, Plato is still more of a thinker than of an artist. As such he is, indeed, a subtle dialectician. He has shown, for instance, that two objects can agree in something that, nevertheless, can not be predicated of either of them - for example they may be two, or similar; in other words he discovered the concept of a relation. He has, as the first, developed a theory of a priori knowledge, showing, or at least attempting to show, that, all things within our experience being imperfect, if we did not measure them by a standard that must be independent of our experience and deeply rooted in our own nature. He has grappled with the concept of pure
matter, that is of a substratum underlying all our perceptions and necessarily implied by them, yet never to be perceived itself. But, of course, his greatest discovery is that of those eternal patterns of all being, which he has, by an ambiguous term, called ideas, but which are not ideas at all (in our sense of the term), but just the meanings of the terms we use, that is to say what we mean by the Good, the Just, the Beautiful and the like. Things and persons begin to be beautiful and cease to be so; but what we mean by that term, the nature or essence of the Beautiful, does not therefore change. It is these changeless natures or essences that Plato called eternal ideas or forms, and in imitation of which he supposed all concrete and individual things to have been fashioned or to have developed. It has, indeed, often been objected by empiricists, from Aristotle onward, that these essences do not, in truth, exist separated from the things the essences of which they are, but can only be found either in them or in our own mind. But that, after all, is a minor and rather technical matter. Call the ideas ideals, and you will see at once the real import of Plato's discovery. The main thing in it is to acknowledge the perfect as the standard of the imperfect, and the enduring, or ever and ever recurring, as the standard of what comes to be and passes away. And this conception, foreshadowed indeed in the Greek notion of the Divine, has, in Western thought for
the first time been grasped by Plato.

Yet we know now, what has for a time been long overlooked, that even the doctrine of ideas was not his last word and not his ultimate interpretation of the mystery of being. As the two fundamental factors or forces, out of which not only all things but all ideas also are compounded, he thought to have described on the one hand the precise, the definite, the enduring order, harmony, symmetry and proportion, on the other the vague, the indefinite, the changing, the unharmonious, the asymmetrical and disproportioned. He held that every number was, in its essence, a synthesis of indefinite multiplicity and definite unity, that every figure implied indefinite extension as well as definite boundaries, that every object presupposed not only indefinite materiality, but also definite ideas to limit and to determine it. But he was, moreover, convinced that in man's soul also virtue means the limitation of desire by reason, and that, in the same way, good government is conditioned by a state of society in which the pursuit of wellbeing is dominated and directed by wisdom. In other words, justice, which, in Plato's language, is equivalent to goodness, is essentially harmony - harmony of the powers of the soul in the individual, and of the orders of society in the city.

And here the thinker passes imperceptibly into the teacher. Metaphysics pass into Ethics, ideas become ideals,
definitions are transformed into postulates. Plato's greatest concern was with the problem what man and what the city ought to be. In his greatest work, in the Republic, he tried to outline the best constitution - to stand out (as he himself says) in heaven for all time to come as a standard by which to estimate realities. But to explain this a gap must be filled up, extreme simplification must be dropped, and one of Plato's most momentous discoveries must be pointed out. He did not hold the analysis of the human soul to be complete, when reason and desire have been distinguished. Between these two there is a third power, linking them together. This is passion or emotion - which, when governed by reason and conforming to it, is not bad; it is, on the contrary, the main instrument by which reason can become active and can restrain desire. Passion conforming to reason - such is courage, such is indignation, such is love, such is enthusiasm. Socrates had considered enthusiasm to be lack of reason, a state approaching alienation. Plato makes him say in the Phaedrus that he had had to submit to the charm of the Muses to feel that even madness could be divine. And it is under this spell that, in that very dialogue, Socrates gives voice to that wonderful hymn in praise of love and enthusiasm, in which he recites the soul's adventures and experiences are it entered the body of man. The soul was winged then and might be likened to a chariot, directed by reason, one
of its horses being passion, the other desire. In the
train of the Gods, following their chariots, it was driven
along on the back of heaven, and so it could look out into
infinity, and there, now and then, it could catch a
glimpse of the eternal forms that subsist there, out of
space and time, being the models of all earthly things.
But the wicked horse of desire dragged it downward more and
more, and so at last it was precipitated on earth, and
losing the use of its wings, was imprisoned within the body
of man. But at one time or the other, when a shade of the
ideas falls upon it, and most of all when it beholds a
beautiful object, just a faint copy of that eternal beauty
once gazed at above, some recollection of that heavenly
spectacle is stirred within it, it regains the use of its
wings and then it is that love is kindled in the soul. -
The just man, therefore, is not simply he whose desires
are restrained and dominated by reason. Courage and
enthusiasm also must be alive within him, overpowering
blind desire, but subservient to reason. And this is a
main point. The discovery of emotion as an independent
power within the soul had, indeed, been more than a
brilliant piece of psychological analysis. (Certainly it
had brought to light the fact that the struggle of Good
and Bad does not simply reflect the contrast of reason and
desire, but rather the opposition of emotion subservient,
and of emotion adverse, to reason. But: it had, moreover,
opened up the pathway to all that we are wont to call sentimentalism, to romanticism as well as to conscious piety. And yet nothing was farther from Plato's mind than to recognise feeling as a value in itself. Stressing as he did the psychological significance of emotion he yet never doubted the absolute supremacy of thought. Noble sentiments are permissible and even laudable, when they refer to what is reasonable in itself. Enthusiasm is, above all, an instrument to enforce the commands of the understanding. It is the great motive towards doing what reason enjoins. And it is the just proportion of reason, emotion and desire that constitutes virtue, for virtue is harmony within the soul. It is the harmonious soul that is just and, at the same time, truly happy, for true happiness is to be found within only and not without. Bliss is to the soul what health is to the body. The just is happy, and his happiness is safe. It can never be endangered from without.

And even so in the state. Dominating wisdom and dominated pursuits of wellbeing must be linked together by force. Philosophers ought to rule, warriors to obey, peasants and craftsmen to be governed. It is just the harmonious cooperation of these three that constitute the best of constitutions. But to render philosophers fit to be rulers, they must be trained to the purpose and they must live a life not exposed to temptation. Now the great
danger to be guarded against is the abuse of power to serve the rulers' own personal ends. A ruler who acted in this way would be of a tyrannical, not of a kingly nature. On the one hand therefore the rulers must be trained so as to withdraw their thoughts from all earthly matters and to focus their attention on the heavenly patterns of justice and virtue. Passing from mathematics to astronomy and thence to metaphysics they must become more and more emancipated from the hold that riches, fame and lust may have had on them, and contemplation of eternal truth must more and more become their paramount aim. On the other hand they must be liberated from all the fetters of private interest. They can not be allowed to possess any private property; all the goods in the city must be the common property of all. Nor can they be permitted to have a family of their own that might fill them with earthly care and even render them partial or unjust; they must lead a manly life by themselves, as soldiers do in a camp, and even in all that concerns the begetting and bringing forth of children, indispensable indeed in the interest of the city, they will have to subordinate their personal desires to the wisdom of the magistrates who will ordain those to couple by whom the fittest offspring may be anticipated. In this way, moreover, a race will be generated such as befits a perfect state: men and women who do not waver, stable in their character and reliable in their trust.
And in the same way stability of all institutions must be aimed at above all other things. No innovations can be admitted, not even in the games of infants or in the songs and dances of the young; for when change begins to creep in, it can nowhere be stopped; and the best of constitutions, once achieved, ought to be assured and preserved for all time to come.

But here again the teacher passes imperceptibly into the seer. For the ideal outlined by the philosopher was not destined always to remain a mere dream. To some extent, at least, it has been realised, and in what measure this realisation might have satisfied the dreamer - this is a question that will never be answered. Anyhow, communities governed by such as did not care for earthly goods and ends, because entirely devoted to the intuition of the Eternal; men and women renouncing all private belongings and possessions and even personal happiness on earth; men and women living without any property and without a family, in order to be fit for a common life, entirely vowed to works of public utility, to study and to contemplation - all this just outlines the state of society generally aimed at and in part realised in the middle ages: laymen led by pious knights and ruled by theologians whose ideals found their fullest expression in the rules of monastic life.

Plato, then, was great not only as an artist, a
thinker and a teacher, but as a seer also. Yet even the greatest have their limitations. When a wanderer by long and persistent climbing, at last reaches the highest summit in a range of hills, what is it that he sees in the far distance and that limits his field of vision? It is the summits of the next range. So with the epochs of history also. In the case of Plato the foresight of genius extended over more than a thousand years. But even so it descried but the crest of the next great wave in the current of the history of mankind.

University of Southern California
Los Angeles - May 28, 1936

Introduction to "Did Plato Believe in Creation?"

In a much more technical vein, Gomperz analyzed one aspect of the thought of Plato in an address delivered at the Metaphysical Society on March 5, 1937. Unfortunately, the text of this address is available only in very truncated form. Because Gomperz' outline notes are less complete than usual for this manuscript, the sentences do not read with anything like the smoothness of those in "Why Was Plato Great?" But if the style is not as elegant, the content is more valuable.

The main purpose of the address is to try to establish whether Plato's belief in creation involved only
"dependence on a first cause" or "creation in time" as well. While Gomperz ultimately is forced to conclude that the question is insoluble, probably because Plato himself did not clearly distinguish between the two types, his insights in the process of arriving at this conclusion are illuminating. These insights are connected with three major issues: (1) Are we to read allegorically the account in the Timaeus that the Demiurge created the soul in a pot? (The question is important since the soul is essential to reason, in turn a sine qua non of the universe, which was conceived as rational and orderly.) If so, how allegorically is it to be taken? (2) What were Plato's philosophical convictions in the last twenty years of his life, when the Timaeus was composed? (3) How much influence did his idea of political degeneration as a series of changes in time have upon his conception of creation?

Gomperz asserts with confidence that Plato's description of the creation is, to some degree at least, allegorical. He points to the invalidity of succeeding Platonist arguments that the description in the Timaeus is straightforward. He points out that in the same dialogue the use of "generating" is clearly metaphorical, and that the Demiurge is merely a personification of the One. Since metaphor and personification are present, it is at least possible that allegory may be admitted as well. The exact degree to which the account is allegorical, however,
cannot be established.

Gomperz points out that Plato's convictions in the last years of his career definitely would favor an allegorical interpretation. It was at this time that he developed his ideas about "generation" of number, magnitudes, the soul, and simple bodies, and the idea of "generation" in this context is clearly a figure of speech.

If the account is purely allegorical, then in all probability only dependence, not creation in time, is intended. For in that case the process of mixing the soul in a pot is mythological, in the same way that identifying Aeolus with the wind is mythological. It is only a means of anthropomorphizing a natural phenomenon in order to conceptualize it, not a means of describing a natural phenomenon in order to explain it.

But, granted Plato's ideas about progressive degeneration of types of government, the evidence pointing to such an allegorical interpretation is less convincing than it might otherwise be. The description of this process in books VIII-IX of The Republic indicates that Plato did have a clearly formulated conception of historical process as chronological progression from a beginning point in time. The change in governmental forms could hardly be viewed as a series related only to logical dependence. The very idea of degeneration implies temporal progression, from earlier to later. Whether Plato's ideas about degeneration
are equally applicable to what he says about generation, however, is the question. Gomperz concludes that while this distinction between creation as logical dependence and creation as arising from a point in time was "never quite absent from his mind" it was never clearly drawn either. He points out that in the Crito Plato makes a feeble attempt to relate the ideal to the historical, but that this is only an afterthought. Clearly, then, Plato's main concern was with creation as logical dependence, though he did have a notion of creation as temporal.

**Did Plato Believe in Creation?**

Delivered at the Metaphysical Society, meeting at Mr. Carr's, March 5, 1937

**Preliminary Remarks**

This question provides a sample of difficulties, ignorance and methods in the study of Pre-Socratic philosophy. Creation does not equal creativity. The issue: creation equal to dependence on a First Principle certainly believed in. Creation is not equal to creation out of nothing. The issue between creation in time and eternal creation is an illustration of this latter concept.

At first sight creation in time seems evident. Extracts from the "Timaeus" show this. The "Timaeus" mentions 2 kinds of being--the cosmos belongs to the latter. Therefore it must have had a beginning, and
therefore a cause also. But it is not easy to discover him and impossible to disclose his notion as pure theocracy. Anyhow, the Demiurge creates the Universe because he is good, using the eternal forms of a perfect organisation.

Therefore, he had to endow the Universe with Reason, & to that end, with Soul also. The Soul is produced as a result of a process of mixture in a pot. The principle of stability being mixed with that of flux, the resulting mixture again being mixed with the 2 original substances, then the soul is spread out in a certain way—forming two circles, inclined at an angle towards each other, corresponding to the equator and to the ecliptic, with certain points in them, corresponding to the planets.

Thereupon the heavens and heavenly bodies are fashioned out of the 4 elements so to speak or the external garments of the Soul, and with them arises Time, as also the celestial gods (and all the other deities that there may be.) Finally these gods are directed to form mortal beings, and particularly man, more or less in imitation of the stars, capable of pure knowledge and mere conjecture as to the equatorial and the ecliptic movement respectively, and to that end the Demiurge furnishes them with the substance of the human souls made out of what had remained unused when the world-soul was mixed (or designed). But all this is the work of Reason, and it has been overlooked to give an account of the works of Necessity (equal to
chance) also and therefore we must go back to the beginning.

As a matter of fact there are 3 kinds of beings—not only unchanging forms and changing objects of sense but there is also that indefinite entity which embodies these changing objects, and which by participating in the forms becomes a definite kind of substance, viz. "one of the four," and which the moderns (justly, I think) have styled "plastic matter." Now before creation, this indefinite substance was not, indeed, utterly devoid of the forms of the 4 elements, but yet was in a state of perpetual flux and instability, and the creation of the Cosmos means that it was, thoroughly and for good, endowed with these Forms—viz. the particles of Fire with the Forms of a Tetrahedron,

Air . . . Octahedron
Water . . . Eicosihedron
Earth . . . Cube

and that to each of these objects there was assigned a definite place in space and that orderly and regular movement was imparted to them.

Difficulties in the Way of the "Historical" Interpretation

Minor difficulties: (1) Who is Timaeus? If he is equal to Archytas, what part of the account is his, and what is Plato's? (2) Who is the Demiurge? If he is equal
to the Idea of the Good, how can that begin to get at a definition here? (3) Could Plato believe that the World-Soul was manufactured in a pot? Is it not evident that this must be understood allegorically? But once we admit allegory where shall we stop?

The overwhelming majority of the succeeding Platonists did not understand Plato that way. (1) Aristotle indeed tries to fasten on Plato in a polemical spirit. He holds----. He says that some interpret----. He objects that if this were right, Plato could not have. But that is obviously invalid----. (2) Xenocrates, the Platonist of the 2 first centuries A.D., and all the Neo-Platonists did not understand him to speak allegorically. (3) Indeed, the only Platonists who do are Crantor, Plutarch and Atticus.

Moreover we do not lack all information about Plato's philosophical convictions at the time the Timaeus was composed (viz. in the last 20 years of his life) and these seem decidedly to point to an allegorical interpretation. The system has been reconstructed by L. Rosin (1908), Frank, Yaeger, Stenzel, Heinrich Gomperz (1930). We can also draw information from (2) the autobiography; (3) the First Academy; (4) the polemics of Aristotle; (5) Theophrastus, who said that Plato "linked up" things to ideas, the numbers to the ultimate elements.

The system contains (a) The ultimate elements;
The System and the Timaeus

What does Plato mean by "generating?" Could he believe that the One "generates" Number from the great and Small in time? If not, it seems clear that "generating" with Plato, is a metaphor, or a figure of speech, standing for what Plato called "natural priority" (described expressly to \( x \) compared to \( x + 1 \), to the idea compared to the object, and to the perfect (e.g. the perfect constituents) as compared to the imperfect (considered as its deterioration), and which, by definition, indeed means only logical independence but which entirely (to his mind) included ontological independence also.

It would seem clear then that Xenocrates and the NeoPlatonists were right in their interpretation of the Timaeus (viz. that \( \star \) the Demiurge is merely a personification of the One (viewed also as the principle of Goodness and Rationality, and that \( \star \) the Cosmos is "created" by him only in the sense of essentially depending on it (as the source of the order to be found in it) at all times, but without, therefore, having had a beginning in time.

And yet, it seems to me, there is a flaw in the
argument. It appears that Plato clearly distinguished between logical and intellectual independence on the one hand, and priority in time. Now, just this seems to me the most questionable, and my main reason for doubting it is the account given in Republic VIII-IX of the progressive degeneration of constitutional Forms. As bad harvests and miscarriages set in after 5040 years Aristocracy degenerates into Timocracy,

Timocracy into Oligarchy,
Oligarchy into Democracy,  
Democracy into Tyranny.

Now this is quite important, inasmuch as degeneracy means transition from what is present by nature to what is past by nature, viz. from the perfect to the imperfect; since a corrupted constitution (as such) can best be described by showing how it differs from an uncorrupted one. But Plato describes that degeneration as an historical process going on in time, alluding to its several stages in a way incompatible with the notion of a mere metaphor.

And this is quite as objectionable with regard to the last links of the series. But could he seriously believe that Timaeus had historically sprung by degeneration from "Aristocracy," which he has all the time described as a bold project never yet heard of and not to be realized except by a sort of miracle (a king becoming
a philosopher or a philosopher a king)?

It is true that in the "Crites" he has made a feeble attempt of endorsing the ideal constitution with a sort of historical reality by pretending that the constitution of prehistoric Athens 2000 years ago, had borne some similarity to it. But this is wholly an after-thought, and moreover (1) Timocracy is the constitution of Sparta and Crete which could not have sprung by degeneration from a primeval Athenian constitution. (2) Nor could this have passed into Timaeus by legend, since according to the creation principle stability was destroyed by a flood and the only vestiges it left behind were records in the annals of the Egyptian priests.

My conclusion, therefore, is that (1) Plato probably never distinguished clearly between the logical and intellectual sense of "next priority" on the one hand and its chronological sense on the other hand. (2) When he says that A generated B, he certainly meant, in the first place, that B essentially depended on A; but the notion of a development in time was probably never quite absent from his mind. (Compare the ambiguity of Spinoza and Locke when speaking of "ideas".) (3) That refers to the degeneration of constitutions, to the generation of Numbers and Magnitudes, but to the creation of the Cosmos also. (4) When he makes Timaeus say that Cosmos was created by the Demiurge what he was mainly concerned with
was, its dependence on the One, viz. on the principle of stability, order and harmony; but to what extent he may have conceived that dependence is a chronological posteriority, we can not make out. (5) After all that has been said the problem "Did Plato believe in Creation" turns out to be insoluble! If that question had been put to him, he would very likely have answered it in the negative. But as a matter of fact, nobody put it to him, and he did not put it to himself.

Introduction to "Evolutionary Conceptions in Presocratic Philosophy"

Gomperz' care not to make too sweeping a claim is exhibited as clearly in his discussion of "Evolutionary Conceptions in Presocratic Philosophy" as it is in his handling of Plato's belief in creation as origin in time. He takes pains to show that the Presocratics believed in evolution only in a very limited sense of the term.

Gomperz begins by discussing the simplest meaning for "evolution"—"historical development." This involves only the cosmogonic speculations made by many of the Presocratics, and does not attempt to establish whether they thought that the process represented change from worse to better. The second possible meaning for "evolution" implies this very change from worse to better (progress). Mostly, however, the Presocratics thought of change as degeneration rather than progress. Still, as
Gomperz points out, there existed a significant strain of thought which recognized certain kinds of changes from worse to better. The third meaning of "evolution," however, was completely foreign to the Presocratics. Even if they perceived progress in the past, they did not expect it to go on in the future. And this "Western idea of progress," involving ongoing change from worse to better, is at the core of what we today mean by evolution.

Gomperz' remarks on the absence of this third idea about evolution in the thinking of the Presocratics again sounds a valuable warning note against reading one's own ideas into the systems of earlier thinkers. As the Presocratics conceived it, evolution could not be (1) an optimistic fatalism, involving unstoppable change from worse to better indefinitely; or (2) guided evolution, development steered by man's intervention in the process of change. Gomperz' discussion implies that these two modern notions are precluded because (1) the Greeks normally thought of progress and degeneration as cyclic, thereby not allowing for an indefinite continuation of change from worse to better; (2) the Presocratics were concerned only to account for the nature of these cyclic conditions, not to intervene in an attempt to alter them.

"Evolutionary Conceptions in Presocratic Philosophy" also is an excellent example of Gomperz' ability to discuss difficult concepts lucidly. He begins
with the simplest sense of evolution (change), then introduces a more complex one (change which is progress), then finally a yet more complex one (change as progress continuing in the future). The largest number and convincing nature of Comperz' examples are also effective. For instance, his remarks about the Pythagoreans, showing that even the Greeks' ideas about the genesis of geometry were cosmogonic, and his comments about Parmenides, who supposedly denied the reality of change, are particularly impressive in developing his point about evolution as historical change.

Evolutionary Conceptions in Presocratic Philosophy

Having been asked something that looks very pedantic—to discuss the term "evolution"—from its many meanings I will select four that seem most relevant to Presocratic philosophy. These are (1) historical development (without judgment of value); (2) development from worse to better (in the past) which equals progress; (3) progress expected to go on in the future, and indeed for an indefinite time, building up to an indefinite degree of perfection. This Dr. Ralph Tyler Flewelling so happily called the "Western idea of progress."

As a parenthesis, there are two interpretations of this latter idea: (1) evolution equals an irresistible current, perhaps to be accelerated or retarded by man, but
not stopped. This is a Fatalist view in large measure, accepted in the second half of the 19th century (Spencer and Marx). They were severely punished for this belief. There was an including of superfluous optimisn by Communism and Fascism. They have shown that unforeseen things can be done, when man instead of more or less passively staring at irresistible evolution, take the trouble actively to direct it. I take it that Dr. Flewelling, and in this I most heartily agree with him, in opposition to this, conceives future evolution as an indefinite series of possibilities that may be realised when willed by men with sufficient energy and consistency. (4) "Darwinism," or development of higher out of lower forms of organic life.

Evolution Equal to Historical Development

Thus understood evolution is the leading idea of the Presocratic philosophers, since its main purpose is to find out, how the world came into Being and became what it is, viz. cosmogony, and even more so than commonly assumed. In this interpretation cosmogony is not really original but only the heir of theogony. Already in Hesiod, for example, the pedigree of divinities that he gives means more than the words, taken literally, seem to imply. In pointing to Chaos as the first of beings, for example, he starts with full wind into the sea of cosmogonic speculation, as, when he says that, the goddess of Husbandry brings forth the
God of Riches, his subject is perhaps rather political economy than mythology. Presocratic philosophy has by and by substituted the substances and forces of nature for the divinities that had been supposed to correspond to them, but has never given up the idea that cosmogony (or the evolution of the universe) was its proper topic.

Modern scholars have often thought that when the Presocratics talk about a primeval substance and its being transformed into other substances, what is really essential in all this is a certain insight of a more or less chemical nature, viz. into the laws that determine what occurs before our eyes every day. And this may indeed be most important to us. But it was not to them. To them the primeval substance meant, above all, the substance out of which the universe had been developed, and when they indeed refer to transformations going on at present also, they do it mainly because they think, that from these facts of experience inferences may be deduced into just how the development of the world may have taken place, and just how it is likely one day to perish.

This was probably the sense in which Anaximines said that air, by rarefaction becomes fire; and by condensation water, earth, etc. and Heraclitus that fire is turned into sea, and sea into earth and back again, and it is indisputably what Thales and Anaximander meant, even before them, when they declared that the world had grown from
water, or arisen from the Unlimited.

A very instructive instance of what they meant, to impress upon you, and at the same time a proof of its truth, is the attitude of the Pythagoreans. They no longer thought that the world consisted of natural elements. They held it was just unlimited space, shaped into things by limiting Forms. But that was not the way they expressed their thought. They said the world had arisen when somewhere in the midst of the Unlimited, one unit was posited and became the first point. Then, as a 2nd unit was added, the first line came into being, while together with a 3rd formed the first plane, which in its turn, a 4th unit being superadded, formed the first body. So even geometry had to be stated in terms of evolution, viz. of cosmogony, if it was to be understood by 6th century thinkers.

If there was one from whom we should have thought necessarily to have abstained from all cosmogonic speculation, it could be Parmenides, since he, on principle denied the reality of change. And yet not. He contrived somehow to tack onto his account of the unchanging world of truth, another account of the delusive world of opinion, which, according to him, could not have arisen except by fire mingling with night, so that the stars, sun, moon and earth came into being. And so even the Unchanging could not be described without pointing to the evolutionary changes, through which the changing must have passed if it were real.
As to the great systems of the natural philosophers of the next generation, it is evident at first sight, that they were propounded in terms of cosmogony. Anaximander commenced his book by saying: "In the beginning all things were together" and then went on to show how by a vertical movement, instigated by thought, all the different substances were separated off out of the original chaos.

Empedocles, too, showed how the four elements, united in the sphere of friendship, were separated by strife, and how, in turn, friendship will one day unite them again, and stated, in detail, how, in both cases, the stars, the earth and the living beings arise and perish. Leucippus and Democritus, also, set forth their atomic theory as an account of cosmogony, asserting that innumerable atoms, whirled about in the unlimited void, met each other, stuck to each other, and so in the end, formed all the inanimate and all the living bodies known to us.

And later still, even Plato, in his Timaeus, conformed to tradition. His account of the structure of the Universe is couched in terms that seem to refer merely to its genesis. Whether he was aware of this and used cosmogony only as a means to a clearer statement of cosmology, was a pointed disputed among his followers. But, that even he made use of evolutionary conceptions, viz. that he speculated—or seemed to speculate—on the development of the Universe, is indisputable.
Evolution Equal to Progress

But now, turn around, and ask whether this development was viewed by the Presocratics as changing from worse to better, viz. as progress, or from better to worse, viz. as degeneration. I think that, on the whole, the latter view has always rather prevailed in Greece. Hesiod already deplored that the original Age of Gold had by and by degenerated into this present age, about which the poet wrote: "Oh, had I been spared living in it, had I died earlier, or been born later; for this is an age of Iron!"

The conception of classicism too, this conception of patterns of perfection stored up in the past, to be imitated now, and never to be surpassed, was at all times deeply rooted in the Greek mind. All the insight, newly discovered at any time, was read into Homer. And Plato carried the theory of degeneration so far, that he said man had degenerated into animals and plants, and the perfect constitution into the imperfect ones, down to tyranny.

True, the progression theory, too, is not unknown. It first took the form of mythology. The order established by Zeus was considered better, viz. less violent and more just, than the disorder that had preceded it. Prometheus had taught man the use of fire; Apollo and the Muses had instructed him in the arts. Heracles and Theseus exterminated monsters and evildoers. And Protagoras, if we may trust Plato, had, in an elaborate myth, shown how
gods had made up for the natural deficiencies of man. If not equal to the hare in speed, nor the lion in strength, man is infinitely superior to both by cunning and craft, by science and art.

The progression theory was also rationinised and humanised. Xenophanes (6th century) said: "It were not the gods that have instructed man; as time went on, he himself found out, what was better." Anaxagoras also hints that there was a world-process devised by thought, so that an order good and beautiful might arise, and he or else his disciple Archelaes seem to have described the beginnings of art and social life. Democritus opined that man had invented the art of singing by imitating the birds. And the notion that mankind had gradually emerged from barbarism into civilization was quite common about 400 B.C. Thucydides illustrated it by many instances in those wonderful chapters of his Archeology /sic/. Some of the dramatists gave expression to it. Plato described the origin of cities by the union of families with admirable succinctness. Nor did Aristotle entertain any doubts in this respect.

Evolution Equal to the Western Idea of Progress

Surprisingly, nowhere is this idea found in Greek philosophy or even Greek literature. Progress may account for the past, but it is never expected to go on in the
future, and still less, forever. There are no allusions
to the view that men attain to higher and higher perfec-
tion. Humans were not thought capable of indefinite per-
fectability. Indeed, what Plato and Aristotle supposed
to happen was a periodic alternation of progress and
retrogression (if there were no floods and earthquakes,
man must have a much higher degree, and so this will
continue).

And that is one of the reasons why Greek philoso-
phers did not believe in reforms achieved step by step.
Improvement was only possible by revolution. Once
achieved, it must be guarded with utmost care against any
change. Innovation, if only in games or tunes, inevitably
leads to overthrowing the constitution.

Introduction to Parmenides
"Way of Truth"

All the manuscripts so far presented are either
drafts of technical articles or transcripts of public
lectures. The following, however, is taken from Gomperz'
class:lecture notes. It is a mark of his dedication as
a teacher that he consistently worked from the original
Greek, translating the text himself when preparing his
lecture notes. His original translation of Parmenides
here reflects once again Gomperz' remarkable objectivity.
Nowhere does he invest Parmenides' work with his own ideas,
but rather, as he should, lets the text present itself.

And now I shall tell thee, and well thou must keep this in mind,

Which are the two only pathways of research and cognition:
The path of Being, of knowing "Not-being cannot be,"
That is the pathway of Instruction, directly preceding Truth,
Whereas the pathway of Not-Being, of Believing "Not-Being must be"

Is, so I tell thee, a path in no way to be explored
Since thou canst not know what is not (and indeed, how couldst thou?)
Nor canst thou name it. - Only what is may be known.

This is what thou must think and say: Being is, for it can be,
Whereas Not-Being cannot: this must thou ever bear in mind.

Therefore beware of this path of error first, but then of this other
Likewise on which ignorant mortals stagger with double faces since in their heart perplexed reason
Directs their steps and so they fare along:
Blind, deaf and dull, alas, confused crowds
To whom what is and what is not appears as one
And not as one, again, so that their path
Does constantly into itself revert.
For no man could achieve that what is not could be.
Therefore avert thy thoughts from this path of research
Lest artful habit force thee to direct
Unto this path thy sightless eye and thy resounding ear
And thy tongue too. By argument thou must decide
The much disputed proof by me propounded
And then but one pronouncement will remain
And will direct thee to the path of Being.


The road of Being is full of marks which clearly show that what is cannot become or perish.
One, full, incapable of quivering or completion
It's neither past nor future, it is now
And all together, a continuous whole.
For whence could it arise and how become?
From nothing? This thou may'st not say or think:
Of Nothing there is neither thought nor speech.
And what need could have promoted Being to spring from nothing later and not earlier?
And hence this follows with necessity:
Being is thorough or it's not at all.
Nor does the force of argument permit
That Being could stem from another Being:
Justice forbids Becoming and Extinction,
But holds it fettered to eternity,
And this is how she justifies the verdict:
To be or not to be! Necessity
Dictates the sentence running thus: Abandon
One of the paths, it is unspeakable
And inconceivable, delusive, but
The other pathway leads to Truth and Being.
How could what is be future or how past?
Had it once been or had it yet to be,
It would not be at present. All becoming
And ending, inconceivable, is thus extinguished.
Nor can true Being ever be divided:
It is a whole continuous and entire,
Not here by more or there by less of Being
Precluded from extending uniformly.
No, as a whole it is with Being filled
And thus does form but one connected mass,
One Being bordering upon the other.
Bare of all motion and by mighty bonds
Enclosed, Being ends not nor begins.
Becoming, Ending have been blown away
Into far distance: Truth has banished them.
And so the same in one same place abides
And constantly endures, because Coercion
Has shackled it within the bonds of Limit.
And since it is, it cannot lack completion:
There's nothing missing in it; were it not,
It would be lacking all. One and the same
Is knowing and to know the known to be,
For never wilt thou knowledge find without
A Being which by knowledge is expressed,
Because at present as in time to come
There's nothing but what is and this is fettered
So that it rests for ever, never moving.
And therefore these are but resounding words
Which mortals use mistaking them for truth
As "Birth and Death," as "Being and Not-being,"
As "change of place," as "Change of shining color."
Aye, limited are the extremes of Being
Nor does on any side it lack completion.
It's like the weight of a well-rounded sphere,
Whose points are equisiarant from the center.
Nor can it have more Being here than there.

Behold what's far away, for spirit shows it
Reliably, as if 't were close to us.
Thou can'st not tear away a piece from Being
So as to separate it from what is.
It can be neither regularly scattered
Nor could it gather here and there, in places.
Since there's no Being that could hinder it
To coalesce. Nor can there be more Being
In one place and less Being in another.
It's far removed from every diminution
And being like itself on every side
It touches Limit.

Introduction to "Remarks on Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound"

Parmenides' poem, like other others of the Presocratics, is both a work of literature and a work of philosophy. It contains good poetry as well as serious speculation. But even those works which are entirely literary are important to the student of Presocratic philosophy. As Gomperz put it, "for the purposes of research the philosophic literature of the ancients cannot be separated from the rest of their literature (in order to determine the meaning of a term as used by a philosopher one must first investigate its meaning in all contemporary writings)."² It is with this justification that I include "Remarks on Aeschylus Prometheus Bound" in a collection of philosophical studies.

In his general remarks, Gomperz takes up several important theses. The first is whether Zeus or Prometheus is "right," and hence whether the play could possibly represent a triumph of justice. While it is unfortunate that the development of this point is confined to less than six lines, Gomperz' conclusion based upon the flawed characters of both Zeus and Prometheus is most interesting.
The wording implies that Gomperz interpreted the concrete acts of Zeus and Prometheus to be representative of the abstractions "justice" and "injustice." If so, then Gomperz ascribes to Aeschylus an ability to function on a much higher level of abstraction than anyone before Plato is usually given credit for being able to do. Whether this was intentional or merely imprecise wording unfortunately is indeterminable, due to the brevity of Gomperz' comment.

The second general remark unfavorably compares Aeschylus' imagination to Homer's. This remark is as intriguing as the first. For Gomperz distinguishes the imaginations of the two writers on the basis of visual versus acoustic. He goes on to offer examples of the way in which Aeschylus' imagination encompassed those things (names and traditions), which appeal to the ear, but was prone to error where visual elements (such as geographical location) were concerned. This realization of the importance of what is heard rather than seen prefigures contemporary discoveries about Greek culture as oral, not written. From an awareness of how much reliance the Greeks placed upon oral tradition, discoveries about the striking differences which this oral tradition made in their modes of conceptualization are a logical next step.

The third general remark explores the possibilities of interpreting certain events in the play according to
psychoanalytic techniques. This approach does not represent a departure from Gomperz' firm policy of not reading contemporary ideas into earlier works. By focusing on Io's dreams, Gomperz attempts to cast some light on the significance of these dreams to the writing of the play. He confines himself to comments about those dream elements which are universal in the human mind—inhibition, paranoia, fantasy. He never attempts to psychoanalyze Io as an individual person in the way that some followers of Freud and Jung have attempted to put other literary characters on the couch. Gomperz uses a psychological approach as a key to meaning, not as an attempt to recreate the play according to his own ideas.

The fourth general remark introduces Gomperz' suspicion that the connection between the strophe and the antistrophe is not as close as many believed. The remainder of the paper is devoted to proving this suspicion, and to making a few other textual comments. These textual remarks exhibit Gompers' firm command of classical Greek. They certainly belie his modest statement that "perhaps I could have achieved more in the field of Greek philosophy had I specialized in it more exclusively and had thereby been enabled to attain to a more complete mastery of the language. That I did not do so was one of my two main handicaps."
Remarks on Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound

General

Neither Zeus nor Prometheus is "right." The former is overweening and unrelenting, the latter is stubborn and \( \gamma\gamma\alpha\nu \ \varepsilon\mu\rho\sigma\tau\omega\mu\varepsilon\). The case is as doubtful as that of Orestes in whose trial the votes are not by accident equally divided. The trilogy could not possibly result in a triumph of "justice."

I have come to suspect that Aeschylus' imagination was not of so clear and limpid a type as that of Homer. Or perhaps I ought rather to say, it may have been of the acoustic rather than of the visual type. In some cases the producer may have supplied what the poet had left in doubt (as with regard to the presence or absence of Bia; the "four-legged bird" that carries Okeanos; the shape of Io--does she have a cow's head only or is she a full-fledged cow?--but in others such supplementation was out of the question. E.g. Prometheus enumerates many arts he taught the mortals, but never says a word about how he did it: did he descend to the earth and give instructions to them? What is the relationship obtaining between the gad-fly, Argus, and the latter's image? They cannot be identical since the gad-fly turned up when Argus was still alive. Nevertheless, both are always simultaneously present and Argus' death does not even seem to have made any differ-
ence. Why, then, did Zeus destroy him? And what had he
looked like? Was he more of a monster than of a herdsman?
Or, if not, what purpose did the "ten thousand eyes"
serve? Would not four have sufficed? How did Zeus' hand
"touch" Io? Assuredly, it was not Victorian decency
that made the poet refrain from informing us concerning the
Where and How? Did she become reasonable and conceive when
the god touched her lap, her womb or her head? I suspect
that Aeschylus himself felt no need to know and was
satisfied with the solemn words ἐνενεφόρησεν ἅμα τοῦτο παλαιότερα
Where is the Caucases located? According to V. 422 close
to Arabia (where the editors are no doubt right in
bracketing the ἰατρικὸς in V. 421 since the poet certainly did
not introduce an anonymous people along side of Amazons,
Arabs and Skythians); but according to v. 719 Io has to
pass it before she leaves Europe and crosses the Kimmerian
Bosporus in order to reach Asia. The conclusion can hardly
be avoided that there was no clear vision of a map in his
mind and that his interest in geography was largely an
interest in unusual names and in traditions associated with
them.

It has occurred to me that some phases of Io's
conduct would appear to suggest some psycho-analytic
comment. To what extent this is due to the popular lore
and to what extent to the manner the poet handled it, may
hardly be determined. The latter was certainly not aware
of any such idea. For him, no doubt, Io's dreams were sent by Zeus, Argus and the gad-fly were real beings, and her wanderings as well as her final deliverance were historical events.

Nevertheless, even according to his own description Io is of unsound mind as long as not restored to sanity (ἐγκαινίας ἐγκαίνειν, v. 848). Her dreams in which "apparitions" tell her that Zeus craves union with her are exactly what they would have to be if prompted by desire and ambition and, most significantly, are treated as such by the chorus (v. 887 ff.): although according to her own presentation of the case, she would seem to be an entirely innocent victim of Zeus' lust and Hera's jealousy, the chorus, in reviewing her entire story, draws from it the following moral lesson: how right was the man who first said that a person ought never to aspire to a marriage above his station! Informed of these dreams, her father sends messengers to diverse sanctuaries. They return with "obscure" advice—evidently such as would have permitted the king to ignore the dreams. But she insists; finally, the oracle yields to this insistence, and Io, "unwilling" (or rather unwilling and willing at the same time), is turned out of the house. But hardly set free, she appears to be beset by inhibitions (among which respect for Zeus' married status does not seem to be the paramount consideration: Hera's jealousy is always referred to in a rather
superficial way and looks like a rationalization more than anything else). If she mated with Zeus, she would be seen by all the world—Argus, the guardian with ten-thousand eyes—would appear to symbolize this phobia in the most impressive way. These 10,000 eyes might, in a sense, be understood as the eyes of the public. And coupled with this fear in some undefined way, there is an attack of frenzy, motivated by the sting of "a gad-fly." At the same time she is turned into a cow, thus being rendered unattractive to Zeus. And yet the idea persists in her that at some future time she will become the bride of the god. Finally this happens in a way which might be regarded as a typical "compromise:" this union will come to pass, but without a normal act of begetting; Zeus will just "touch" her and thereby she will at once be restored to reason and will conceive and bear a son! According to this phantasy, she will, in a sense, after all become a virgin and mother!

I have become somewhat suspicious of the assumption that the correspondence of strophe and antistrophe is as close in Aeschylus as is mostly supposed. The problem is whether we do not purchase the fulfillment of this postulate by an all too great number of changes in the manuscript tradition. The issue may be formulated a little more precisely: do we not assume the unanimous manuscript tradition more frequently to be at fault and, in particular,
to be defective, on account of this postulate, in the 
sounds than in the dia- and monologues, although there is 
assuredly no plausible reason why the copyists should have 
misread and omitted words in the former case more fre­
quently than in the latter. Evidently, the question could 
be definitely answered only on the basis of a comprehensive 
statistical investigation that could not be restricted to 
one play or even to one poet. In the meantime, some of 
the instances that gave rise to my suspicion will, 
together with some passages of a different nature, be 
discussed on the following pages.

Particulars

(These remarks are based on the edition of 
Wilamowitz (Berlin, 1914), Mason (Paris, 1920) and Murray 
(Oxonii, 1934). V. 113:

$\sigma\mu\omega\varsigma\iota\omega\sigma\omega\varepsilon\upsilon\mu\varepsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ (Manuscripts).
$\sigma\mu\omega\varsigma\iota\omega\sigma\omega\varepsilon\upsilon\mu\varepsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma\lambda\lambda\omicron\alpha\omicron\omicron\omicron$ (Wilamowitz)
$\sigma\mu\omega\varsigma\iota\omega\sigma\omega\varepsilon\upsilon\mu\varepsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma\lambda\lambda\omicron\alpha\omicron\omicron\omicron$ (Mason, Murray)

There is no obvious reason why either of these two 
forms should have been mis-read by a copist /sic/. The 
interesting point is whether Aeschylus was always 
grammatically "correct" or sometimes indulged in "poetic 
license." I see no reason why he should not have done this, 
just as many modern poets have done by offending against 
the traditional rules of their respective languages.

V. 399 ff. The first thing to notice is that
nature is not moved by compassion for Prometheus only, but for the entire race of the Titans (Ἰδὲ σὰρ ἐνυψαμμούν τὸ τιμᾶν ἐνυψαμμοῦν —, v. 409 f.). The mortals who are specifically interested in the sufferings of Prometheus (v. 413 f.: σῦξ σχάρασι συγγαράμμεσι —) are the inhabitants of "holy Asia" and the adjoining lands (apparently because geographically near the place of these sufferings). No Greek tribe or city is mentioned among these. Hence, it is logical that Atlas should be an object of lamentation like Prometheus. V. 399 ff. the manuscript tradition seems to be:

\[ \textit{Sānuσιστακτ}"οτοριού} \textit{τρφων τον ἔσω ὑπῶν \textit{με}βοσμ ἔνν ἐπῶν ὑπὸ \textit{τοτίωnioτοσ} ἔρεωνν ἔτεχνον \textit{τού γαράς}. \]

On the ground of lacking correspondence with the antistrophe Wilamowitz strike out \textit{με}βοσμ ἔνν while Mason and Murray add a choriambus after \textit{τρφων τον ἔσω}. Why should the copists have overlooked it? If, on the other hand, we drop \textit{με}βοσμ ἔνν the construction becomes very artificial. \textit{ἀκρωτητάκτωρ προσ} must then be taken as an "inner accusative" governed by \textit{τ} even though the dative information thereby provided is actually already expressed by the instrumental dative \textit{τοτίων ὑγάς}. It might then be even more advisable to read \textit{ἔτεχνονν} whereby \textit{σανυσιστακτ} ακτρού προσ would become the subject.

V. 425 ff. is given up as hopeless by almost all editors. But, as already pointed out, it is quite consis-
tent that another suffering Titan should also be referred to. And the chorus quite reasonably emphasizes that Atlas is the only other one whom they have seen (μόνον ἴτι τρασιλένος...τιτάν), for the simple reason that all the rest suffer in Tartarus where they cannot be seen by any but the chthonic divinities.

V. 426: the editors change ἀκαμαντητήτοι into ἄθραμπτοδέοι, although Atlas' disgrace (ἡμη) has nothing to do with steel but is actually in the nature of "untiring bonds."

V. 428 ff. indeed remain unintelligible as long as ὀδηρὸς is assumed to denote Atlas' strength. But the ὀδηρός ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰών: οὐδὲν θαμαίνει οὐκ ἡμῶν τὸ ἱερὸν...makes it clear that the strength referred to must be the pressure of the heavenly sphere. If, now, we suppose ᾃπαχθόναν to mean, as it mostly does, Eximious, Outstanding, Superior, we shoul, I think, best change υπαρτοῖτο into υπαρτίναυ (a verb not otherwise traceable in the classical period, but perfectly analogous to ςπειαυτεὶ and ρουςι, which are both to be found in Pindar) and view τὴν ἵψα τοῖς as instrumental and governed by υπαρτίναυ. The lines would then read:

"Ἀτλάντζν ἵς ἴτι τρασιλένος ὀδηρῶν ὁ ἦμων
ὑπαρτίναυ τῷ ἱερότου τῷ ἱερότου
τὴν ἵψα τοῖς ὑποστετερῷς ζειτην.

But considering the contrast between ὀδηρῶν and ὑπαρτίναυ, the former may well be supposed to mean
"hanging over" and to govern ἐπὶ τῶν as a dativus incommodi and thus even the slight change mentioned above becomes unnecessary and we may translate: Atlas, who groans under the fierce strength of the heavenly sphere, ever hanging over his back.

V. 432 The editors make a point of punctuating after ζωμόταν. But why should the breakers moan rather when falling than when rising? Actually, this punctuation weakens, to some extent, the grandiose unity of the passage:

The surge of the Ocean shouts;
Tuning in, the deep laments;
Hades' dark cave beneath the earth utters a low moan;
And the founts of holy streams
Lament for mournful grief.

V. 438: Ἰεύς ἵμαντον ὡς ἢ προκαλεσσομενον. Hesychius explains the latter verb as tantamount to προκαλεῖν. This seems to be confirmed by the only other passage in which the word occurs, viz. Aristophanes, Frogs 730: τῶς ἔχει ὁ προκάλεσσομεν. There would, however, be much more point in Prometheus' remark ("I am silent, not from pride, but because I see myself προκάλεσσομεν -- in this way") if we might understand the word as equal to προ-σώ-σεσσομεν, and in Aristophanes too the noble characters might no less aptly be "pited" or
"looked down upon" than "degraded". For what Prometheus has learned from the foregoing chorus was not that he was degraded or disgraced (he knew that long since and had not failed to say so more than once), but that he had become the object of universal pity and compassion. And this might very well have induced him to remain silent for shame.

V. 476 ff. Prometheus boasts of the "more wonderful" arts he had revealed to mortals. They seem to be those that might be described as "occult", viz. in which the connection of cause and effect is not obvious. Among them is medicine and, of course, the arts of divination. In discussing the significance of birds, magic imperceptibly passes into ornithology. V. 493 there follows the art of the haruspices: what is the state and color of the bowels and, in particular, of liver and gall (of a victim) pleasant to the gods?

The editors, with the exception of Mason, apparently more thoroughly initiated than Aeschylus was, fancy that it is the color of the gall and not of the bowels that concerns the gods and hence write:

But this is hardly a sufficient reason for tampering with
the text: the poet's views on the matter ought to be gathered from his words and not from any extrinsic information.

W. 545: ψετε διώκεται καθισμάτων δισκίαρχε ιδίως...

Wilamowitz and Murray, following Triclinius, transpose two words and read: δισκίαρχε διώκεται in order to render the metrical correspondence with the antistrophe still closer, while Mason for the same purpose, adopts Hermann's queer proposal: διώκεται δισκίαρχε, supposed to mean: "would lie. Furtwängler, te wart dein bi. rief ." But why should the copists have arbitrarily changed the order of these words? Again, for the same reason, they suppose that at the end of v. 550 a spondeus has dropped out, either ρηματικά (Bergk) or μαλακά, (Wilamowitz). But why should the copists have omitted these words; nor do they add anything to the meanings.

V. 557 presents a real difficulty:

What may ἀλησθήσαμεν mean? The scholion mentions three interpretations: 1. It might be used ἄτοκενας; but why should a θηρίον have a father?; 2. It might mean ἵνα ἔστω (ἀυτοῖς); 3. It ought to read ἀλησθήσαμεν, ward it off, Earth! Most editors have adopted the latter interpretation, though it will impress any unbiased reader as being highly artificial and does not make sense from a metrical point of
view; moreover it would presuppose the identity of the
οἰστρόχ and the εἰσφώλο̣ which is hardly possible since the
gadfly was already in existence while Argus was still
alive. Wilamowitz reads ἀνέκδομεν and eliminates ἐνοβόμων
which he takes to be a marginal explanation of ἀνέκδομεν.
But ἀνέκδομεν instead of ἀνεκδομεν would be as incorrect as
ποσο-ἀληθινό̣ and if it were a contracted form of ἀληθινό̣, it
could not govern εἰσφώλο̣ and the above difficulty would
remain. I suspect that the 2nd explanation of the scholion
might be right after all and that, in popular parlance
ἀνεκδοτις may have meant a ghost. A copist may have noted
ἀνεκδοτις on the margin as explaining εἰσφώλο̣ and Aeschylus
would then simply have written: εἰσφώλο̣ Ἀργοῦ ὁμήρους
 propriéς
v. 595: ἐς τέρσο μ' ω ταλαι τών ταλαι
τῷ ρα̣ απὸ τᾶς εἰσφωλμα ὀποιοδεξιτῆς.
The corresponding line of the strophe reads:
 Consequently, the editors feel compelled to depart from
the manuscript text: Mason reads: ἔτι χαίρων τοίς ὠφελήθην τοι bọ̣ τῆς ἐνταλαζον (v. 577); Murray brackets τῶν (the resulting
construction being against the poet's usage, at least all
through this passage), Wilamowitz substitutes τῶν ταλανω
for τῶν ταλαιτων. But again the question must be raised:
why should a copist have mis-read ταλαιτων for ταλανω, or
for what other reason should he have replaced the latter
word by the former? Are we so sure that Aeschylus always
insisted on precise correspondence?

V. 680: ἡρεσιοκητος ἀντον ἀφνύσιος μέθει τοῦ τιμήτου εὐσταχίαν.

It is of no importance whether we retain ἀφνύσιος or, with Elmsley, Murray and others, replace it by ἀφνύσις. But why are editors so sure that the former is wrong? The metric irregularity it exhibits is, after all, very slight. Nor could the meaning be in doubt for a moment. But I am mainly concerned with Wilamowitz note: "Manifesta corruptela non sanaretur substituta voce cui ineset eadem notio quae iam in ἀντονοκητος est". This, to me, appears quite wrong. "Unexpected" and "sudden" are not at all the same. Argus' death may have been unexpected AND sudden. But when, e.g., a warrior is slain in battle, his death may well be sudden, but is certainly not unexpected.

V. 691: τοῦ κατα, μυματα, διμυκαί, ἀπαξίωσιν τῶν ὀξεὶν ζῷαν.

There is some reason for Wilamowitz' proposal to read τοῦκατα instead of τὺνειν. For though a soul may be chilled, it can hardly be chilled by a sting. But why he as well as Murray, following G. Hermann, eliminate διμυκαί, seems difficult to understand. Metrical interpretation must be based on the text, and not vice-versa. Who will credit a copist with having added διμυκαί on his own initiative, without any basis in tradition? As a matter of fact, the three words admirably sum up the ἐλεύθερος: the sting of the gadfly entails suffering (δυματα), her transformation
of disgrace (Ἀμαρτία), Argus' image terror (Στρομόν); indeed, it was this terror of which she herself complained in v. 567: ψοβον μενι τὸν μυρίτων ζυγων βούταν.

v. 895: ἐν Μοῖρα... χαίρων γὰρ ἀντετρανόμοι ἀναμαινόμεναι Ἰδοὺ γὰς μω, Ἀρτομνᾶν ἀναστάδονος Ἀρεὶς Ἀλλαγάς ὠτόνων.

In order to achieve strict correspondence with the corresponding verses of the strophe, editors insert either ὑτόνων before, or μάκρομενοὶ (or some equivalent epithet) after Μοῖρα, without, of course, being able to point any reason why the epithet should have dropped out. The problem is whether the evidence does not tell rather against the law of strict correspondence than for the assumption that the copists were particularly careless when copying songs. Furthermore, since the scholion notes: Μικρὸν τὸ γ., it is almost universally assumed that the manuscripts originally read: Ἀμαρτία (or τραχύς) ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπών. Modern editors, following Weil, read: Ἀμαρτομένου (or Ἀμαρτομενίων) although, as Wilamowitz avows ("Τοῦ νυν languet") ὠτόνων may then hardly be accounted for. It would seem that Ἀμαρτία (or: γνῶρις) ὑπὸ τὸ μυρίων would be much more satisfactory: we tremble when we behold Io's maidenhood which lacks the love of man and, at the same time is affected by suffering, as a consequence of the goal-less wanderings imposed upon her by Hera.
Wilamowitz brackets (while Mason simply omits) \( \omega \nu \mu \xi \phi \nu \tau \mu \zeta \). Murray, following Headlam, reads: \( \delta \nu \zeta \xi \varsigma \nu \tau \mu \zeta \nu \) . The copist who felt that \( \rho \alpha \mu \zeta \rho \iota \rho \nu \beta \sigma \gamma \) had to be explained by a marginal note must have been a poor scholar indeed. On the other hand, if the poet chose to say "such a marriage would have no terror for me; I should not be afraid", such pleonasm would hardly be surprising, much less inadmissible. Nor do I see why, with Wilamowitz, we should have to bracket \( \theta \epsilon \nu \nu \) . \( \nu \epsilon \iota \iota \varepsilon \sigma \sigma \zeta \nu \nu \) does not imply any greater "nobilitatis gradus in deis" than \( \tau \iota \omega \nu \tau \nu \xi \varsigma \iota \sigma \varepsilon \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \) (v. 897). What would seem to be doubtful is rather whether \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \iota \zeta \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \) may be construed as an "inner accusative". The god might "glance a glance", but can he "glance an eye"? If not, the remedy is obvious: we might strike out \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \iota \zeta \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \) as a marginal note on \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \) and read simply: \( \mu \xi \jmath \nu \iota \iota \varepsilon \sigma \sigma \zeta \nu \nu \theta \epsilon \nu \nu \) \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \iota \zeta \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \) \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \).

Supplementary Note

V. 371: It has often been remarked that Aeschylus' description of an eruption of Mount Aetna closely resembles that given by Pindar, Pythagoreans 1, 21 ff. Farnell, in his edition of Pindar, rightly assumes that Pindar's account was known to Aeschylus. That the resemblance is not purely accidental is evident from the identity of some of the terms used and in particular of the word \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \nu \rho \tau \omicron \nu \vartriangle \tau \nu \). Although it is, of course, entirely appropriate to designate
the lava as "unapproachable", the term would hardly have suggested itself to both poets independently and since Pindar's description is much fuller and riched in detail, his description must be supposed to have been the original, and Aeschylus' the copy.
Notes

1 Such articles as "Problems and Methods of Early Greek Science," reprinted in Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz, indicate his interest in early science. His interest in the scientific empiricism of Carnap and his continued interest in psychoanalysis illustrates his concern with modern science.

2 From a memorandum of Gomperz to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, September 28, 1939.

3 For an extensive discussion of this point, see Eric A. Havelock's Preface to Plato (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1967). There is a particularly good summary of Havelock's major thesis on pp. 234-235.

4 Havelock, pp. 234-235.

5 Robinson, p. 21.
CHAPTER III

ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The manuscripts presented in this chapter cover more heterogeneous subject matter than do those in the last chapter. "Creativity" is about the psychology of the creative process; "Responsibility" covers the ethics of being held accountable for one's actions; "The Logic of the Historical Sciences" equates the historical criterion of "simplicity" with the scientific criterion of "relative frequency;" the "Letter to Professor Sisson" takes up some of the main principles behind German Nazism; and "The Nature and Purpose of the State" is a lengthy treatment of the theory and practice of government. Whatever their specific subject matters, however, all are addressed to current philosophical problems.

Introduction to "Creativity"

"Creativity" links the process of artistic conceptualization to gestalt psychology. Creativity involves the matching of anticipated, innate patterns with the actual data of experience. How one achieves the independence which is so central to creativity lies in the ways in
which he arranges objects which he perceives around him. A great composer, for instance, will use the same features in work after work, though he will not use the same figures or melodies. Gomperz is not describing what an artist should do, but rather what he actually does. He uses as an example the only form of higher creativity shared by all men, dreams. He points out that while the people, places, and events in dreams are constantly changing, the elements from which dreams are made remain the same. This short composition is an attempt to apply the findings of modern psychology to one of the most intriguing aesthetic problems: the way in which the mind of the creative artist works. Its goals are modest; but it does emphasize the importance of pre-established types in the creation of images.

Creativity

A certain amount of creativity is implied in the phenomenon of "Gestalt;" we do not apprehend things as they are, but refer them to a pre-existent pattern. (Psychological counterpart to Plato's theory of ideas, particularly as presented in the Phaedo). Speaking broadly, the reason for this seems to be that it is "Gestalten" that releases pre-established instincts. (An animal does not wait for experience to tell it that something given is "food" or "prey"; it reacts towards the
given as "food" or "prey," that is to say, apprehends it by these "Gestalten."

The second step is to see that in a certain sense we create all the objects of our environment, and in particular all our fellow-men. We do not apprehend them as what they are (adding one feature of their being to the other, as these features reveal themselves in the course of time), but as instances of certain definite types (or, in other words, as fulfillments or realisations of certain definite expectations or anticipations) that pre-exist within us, and what experience does is rather to convince us either that we ought to have apprehended them as instances of other types or that they represent but incomplete and unsatisfactory approximations to the types anticipated.

This point of view must be connected with that of psychoanalysis, according to which it is the imagines of the first objects of our infantile affections that determine our apprehension of fellow-men and women throughout life (Don Juan always again and always again trying to recover his mother or his nurse; the man who substitutes God or the king or his leader to his father who has died or his appointed man).

The two views seem to supplement each other. On the one hand, psychoanalysis overlooks that probably even the image was not simply a datum of experience, but merely
the first fulfilment of a Gestalt-anticipation, namely the first object of an innate attitude (looking up to x; clinging to y). On the other hand it is probably right in assuming that even the accidental features of the first realisations of an innate anticipation may come to acquire a life-long significance when retained in the image. (The beloved must be fair or tender; the leader tall or slow).

It must be admitted, however, that such accidental features of the image seem to tend rather to impair than to enhance creativity, since they limit the scope of its potentialities. On the other hand they may prove valuable by supplying the material to be used by it.

The image, inasmuch as it introduces the past into the present and thereby emancipates thought from the exclusive domination of the requirements of the moment, already implies a first element of creativity, creativity certainly involving a certain degree of independence with reference to the actual environment. Yet as far as it is determined by past experience, it certainly lacks essential elements of creativity.

An important mis-problem seems to refer to the degree of individuality to be found in pre-established types. In a sense, even the image bears an individual stamp. It may even essentially contribute to individual creativity, as far as this reveals enduring and persistent features. Take the female types of Perugino or Francesca
or Filippino or Leonardo etc., or the always recurring character types of a novelist /sic/ or dramatist.

Yet, in another sense, there is something contrary to creativity in this very endurance and persistence. The works of a truly creative poet or musician will indeed reveal some persistent features in most of their figures or melodies, but he will not produce the same figures or melodies over and over again. And the persistent features of his work therefore will seem to be due rather to the persisting uniqueness of his individual character than to the immutability of his imagines.

Moreover the only manifestation of higher creativity to be found in all men, viz. the creative element in their dreams, reveals—notwithstanding a certain uniformity of stamp—perpetually changing productions. The persons, places and even situations in my dreams are new every night.

May we assume them to be the results of our persistent anticipations and imagines on the one hand, and of changing experience on the other? If so, the creations of dreaming would have to be explained either by alternate predominance of these anticipations or by varying experiential material being used and formed by these anticipations and the same alternative would then be likely to be valid for the changing productions of the artist as well.
Introduction to "Responsibility"

"Responsibility" is another classroom lecture. Like "Creativity," it reflects Gomperz' continuing interest in psychology and physics. He emphasizes that the essence of responsibility is imputation, or being held accountable for an act. When one is held accountable, one is either praised or blamed. And from praise and blame the psychological attributes self-reproach and self-satisfaction are derived.

Closely related to praise and blame are reward and punishment. "Reward" Gomperz defines as "tenderness" and "punishment" he equates with "rationalised retaliation." The influence of psychology here is obvious. Furthermore, Gomperz asserts that punishment and reward, praise and blame, and self-reproach and self-satisfaction are simply expressions of a "blind vital instinct of retaliation."

It is only when retaliation is reasonable that it has a bearing upon responsibility, for only then is conduct chosen with conscious rationality. But at this point the difficulty of determining what is "reasonable" arises. Gomperz responds that retaliation is reasonable when it promotes desired conduct and checks undesired conduct. But he notes that retaliation can affect conduct only insofar as conduct can be predicted. If one cannot tell in advance what effect the punishment or reward that he is administering will have, it becomes irresponsible because
irrational. At this point we can recognize the former student of Ernst Mach. Gomperz recognizes the uncertainty principle, which warns that we can never predict with absolute certainty. But Gomperz does not stop here. He points out that while in theory we can never be certain, we can still be certain enough for practical purposes, if we take two factors into account: (1) whether the agent was aware of the moral significance of his actions, and (2) whether the agent might have been influenced by this awareness. At the conclusion of "Responsibility" Gomperz makes the important point that retaliation is irrational even if it does affect conduct, if it does not affect conduct in the greatest possible way.

Responsibility

There is a widespread notion, among philosophers at least, that responsibility is something particularly sacred and mysterious, and that it is just in this its mysterious character that it is somehow bound up with liberty in the metaphysical sense of the term. I contend, reversely /sic/, that it is something quite simple and natural, and that as far as it is concerned with liberty at all, this relationship, which, also, is perfectly clear and rational, can refer to liberty only in the every-day sense.

What is responsibility? The term is not always
used in exactly the same sense. There is a derived meaning, as when we say: "I felt all the gravity of the responsibility of my position," or: "I preferred to act on my own responsibility." Here it is presupposed that there is such a thing as responsibility, and the question is merely whether, in a particular case, it is more or less grave, as: whether, in a particular case, it ought to be shared with another, or not.

This derived meaning will have to be considered later on, at present we are concerned with the fundamental meaning of the term, in which it indicates whether or not a particular person is to be held responsible or (with another word) held to account for a particular act, that is to say, whether or not the act may be imputed to the person. Now, what is meant by the statement that the person N is held responsible or accountable for the act X, or that the act X may be imputed to the person N?

But here again, we must distinguish two questions: (a) what is the essence of imputation (or holding to account) from a psychological point of view? (When is an act imputed?); and (b) when is it reasonable (or defensible on rational grounds) to hold a person accountable for an act? (When ought it to be imputed?)

What is the meaning of holding somebody accountable, from a psychological point of view? As has already been pointed out when the term moral significance was
explained, holding to account stands for three couples of terms, viz:

punishment and reward,
blame and praise,
self reproach and self satisfaction
(bad conscience) (good conscience)

Literally, of course, the person responsible or accountable for X is the person who can and must answer questions concerning X, who can and must take the blame if he cannot, or the praise, if he can, explain it satisfactorily. Now, from a psychological point of view, self reproach may be derived from blame. It is indeed, self-blaming, viz. the projection into one's own consciousness of blame attributed to others who, in some way or other, are regarded as authorities (environment, parents, sages, ideal judges). One might say that a man's conscience is his judgment on his own conduct insofar as he is a member, and shares in the views, of the group to which he belongs.

And, in the same way, self-satisfaction may be derived from praise. Moreover, blame may be derived from punishment. It is, in fact, punishment spiritualised, and the close connection of both stands out very clearly in the simplest cases, as when a parent runs after a naughty child, or after an adult evildoer also, and, having reached him, boxes his ears and calls him names. Here the original identity of chastising and chiding is indeed perfectly
manifest. And, in the same way, praise may be derived from reward, as is seen, e. gr., in a mother patting a good child and at the same time coaxing and calling him pet-names.

Now, punishment is really nothing but rationalised revenge or retaliation. That is to say, we call retaliation punishment, when we think it reasonable to apply it, as serving a reasonable purpose, and since the question of rationality is to be discussed separately, we might even have derived blame immediately from retaliation. But retaliation, in its turn, may be derived from defense, and is, indeed nothing but prolonged defence—which becomes very manifest when we think of what is apt to happen when an act of aggression is defeated: the aggressor once kept off, we do not stop at once, we are likely to run after him and, if possible, to chastise him on the spot, at the same time not sparing all sorts of names to abuse him with, so that here the way in which defence, retaliation and blame are naturally linked to each other, becomes visible to every eye. And, in a very similar way reward, or to speak more precisely, every expression of sympathy and good will (since "reward" also presupposes, in a manner, some rational justification) may be considered as a mere prolongation of natural tenderness, patting, rewarding and praising also forming but one unbroken chain.

Now, the important thing to notice is that defence
and tenderness are instinctive reactions in certain determinate situations of organic life, and that therefore, those other phenomena derived from them, viz. punishment and reward, praise and blame, self-satisfaction and self-reproach, as long as the problem of their rationality is not considered, are nothing else also, that is to say, there is nothing sacred or mysterious about them, they are simply expressions of a blind vital instinct of retaliation.

And, moreover, they have no relation to freedom at all: the child chastises the table and we chastise animals, and feel even inclined to chide fate and chance, without, therefore, ascribing any sort of freedom to them. It is only when the question of whether and in what cases such a proceeding is reasonable turns up, that the problem of responsibility or imputability may be connected with that of freedom, but questions of rationality mostly admit of a rational answer also.

When Is Retaliation Reasonable?

With a few (real or apparent) exceptions, hardly worth considering in the present connection, retaliation is reasonable only when it tends to promote desirable or to check undesirable conduct. It is only an apparent exception when we punish, etc. a man for conduct not undesirable, perhaps, in itself, but because of its consequences, e. gr., because hurting people's feelings or
even considered as scandalous and therefore rendering to public disorder. (For example a person entering a mosque with his shoes on his feet, or a drunk with his hat on his head.)

The only real exception seems to be constituted by the case, in which the pain (or, to speak more generally, the harm) inflicted is decidedly smaller than that caused by our being prevented to give vent to our vindictive instincts. In theory, at least, a man might acquire mental disease by not being allowed freely to react upon an insult, even if he was insulted by a mad-man or some other irresponsible person, and might perhaps escape that disease if allowed to curse unchecked. And perhaps something of a similar character, indeed, happens when cars threaten to collide; at least, it seems to be recognized that the driver of one may call the driver of the other a damned fool, even being perfectly aware that the "fool" was entirely ignorant of what he was about and had not the slightest idea of doing anything wrong. But this consideration, completely unimportant as far as responsibility is concerned, becomes very grave with reference to the gravity of the retaliation, compared with the gravity of the offence, viz. against exaggerated punishment or against exaggerated self-reproach.

This is clear in the case of punishment, blame and self-reproach since these inflict pain, and the infliction
of pain is, of course, rational only when the evil which it constitutes is overbalanced by a greater good.

It might perhaps, at first sight, be doubted whether the same holds good also of reward, praise and self-satisfaction, since these are so pleasurable, and in so far good, in themselves. Well, in a certain measure this is what we do in "courtesy". But it is evident that undeserved reward, praise and self-satisfaction are apt to produce undesirable consequences, greatly outbalancing that good, since they blunt the moral sense and destroy our indispensable stimulus to desirable conduct. (A man that is rewarded or praised, or who is satisfied with his own conduct without having done anything worth being rewarded or praised, or being satisfied with himself, will--as far as the consequences go--have no inducement to do anything really deserving of these pleasurable experiences.)

Retaliation Is Reasonable When It Is Just

The answer is, of course, correct, but insufficient and does not go to the root of the matter. The notion of justice is bound up with that of judgment. Now punishment (the only form of retaliation commonly entrusted to judges) does not change its nature by being administered by a judge. It is the office of the judge (a) to make sure that no innocent person be punished (innocent either not having
done the act or not fit to be held responsible for it); (b) that punishment be in a proper ratio to the offence and (c) to administer punishment in a peaceful and orderly manner, not resulting in public disorder (such as might arise, if retaliation were left to the wronged party).

Yet this does not even imply (as is sometimes supposed) that the judge ought to judge dispassionately. Under present circumstances this will indeed very often be the case. But certainly administration of justice by machines is not its most perfect form, and nobody would picture to himself God judging the world in such a fashion. The judge ought to be inspired by the spirit of retaliation (he ought to be indignant at the offence), only purified from all emotions personal and irrelevant.

In other words, if punishment (retaliation generally) were not reasonable in itself, it could not become so by being administered justly, viz. by an impartial judge. The reason for its being reasonable has, therefore, to be looked for in another direction.

Punishment is, of course, the most important case of retaliation. Now, the question concerning the "end" of punishment, viz. how punishment can be rationally justified, has been very frequently discussed. It is frequently maintained that the end of punishment is atonement. But this explanation, in truth, presupposes the rationality of punishment. It amounts to stating that an impartial
spectator feels satisfaction when seeing an offender justly punished, and this, really, means that he sympathises with the vindictive instinct of the wronged party, when this is purified from all personal and irrelevant emotions. But retaliation cannot become reasonable merely by the fact that unconcerned people, also, sympathise with it. If it were unreasonable in itself, it would remain so, if all the world sympathised with it. Its true justification, therefore, must be another one.

The ends alleged are: (1) to render the culprit unable to do any further harm; (2) to make him reform; (3) to deter him from doing further harm; (4) to deter others from similar misdeeds. Now all these ends seem to be legitimate, and they may be summed up in the one end of checking undesirable conduct. And ends 2-4 hold good also of blame, as ends 2-4 hold good of self-reproach too. And corresponding considerations may be advanced with regard to reward, viz. (2) to fortify and foster the rewarded person's laudable inclinations; (3) to incite him to other praiseworthy actions; (3) to incite others to acts of the same sort. Now, these ends also may be summed up in the one end of promoting desirable conduct, and ends 2-4 will apply to praise also, as 2-3 will apply to self-satisfaction too. Summing up, therefore, we may say, that retaliation is justified and thereby turned into reasonable imputation (responsibility) when and as far as it tends to
check undesirable and to promote desirable conduct.

But now, the further question arises: when does it, and when does it not, do so? (1) When its effect on conduct (desired or undesired) can be (with greater or lesser certainty) be foreseen (=predicted). You can not promote or check conduct by means whose effects on conduct you can not foresee. This, in principle, implies determinism—not indeed, as if determinism might be proved from the rationality of responsibility, since we do not know without just that proof whether there is perfectly rational responsibility at all. But in the sense that responsibility will be the more rational, the nearer determinism it is to truth. If we could tell beforehand at all, what the effect or holding a man responsible or his and other men's conduct was going to be, responsibility would be absolutely irrational. If we knew with absolute certainty it would be perfectly rational. As it is, we can indeed ascribe a sufficient degree of rationality to imputation, but only because we suppose to know how the awareness of retaliation works as a general rule and that the element of uncertainty, which ought, thereby, to be taken into account, may be neglected for practical purposes.

(2) When the agent was, or might have been, aware of the moral significance of his action, and when this action was, or might have been, influenced by this awareness. If the agent was not aware of the moral
significance of his act, that is to say, if he was ignorant of it, and if his ignorance was not due to any fault or negligence on his part, that is to say, if it was unprovoked ignorance, then retaliation could have no effect in a similar case, and it would therefore be irrational to hold the agent responsible. Take the case of a poet, whose poems I declare to be worthless and who therefore commits suicide. If it could be proved that there was not the slightest indication pointing to an overexcited state of the man's nerves, there would be no rational ground for blame or self-reproach. On the other hand if the agent, although being aware of the moral significance, could not have been influenced by this awareness in his action, that is to say in the case of coercion and if it was in no way his fault or negligence that caused him to be in this state of coercion, that is to say if it was a case of unprovoked coercion, then retaliation would also be irrational. Take the case of a man locked up in a room or chained to a block and thereby prevented from giving evidence exculpating another man innocently accused of a crime.

But perhaps the most important condition of rationality is that responsibility will not be rational, if not applied in such a way as to produce the greatest possible effect upon conduct (desirable or undesirable). Take, e.g., the case of calumny or slander. A invents a false and invidious story, B, C, D repeat it. Now, it is
not irrational in itself to blame (or even to punish), B, C, D for carelessly repeating a malignant rumour without checking it; yet the really rational thing to do is, to blame or to punish A for inventing it.

Who so? Because (1) the number of the B, C, D is indefinite, and even in you stop a hundred, a 101st will turn up, and (2) the offence of each of them is so slight that a retaliation correspondingly slight will have only a very questionable effect; whereas (3) A is only one, and if you can stop people inventing such stories, you can stop the whole thing and B, C, D will have nothing to repeat; and (4) moreover, A’s offence is so gross and palpable that a retaliation correspondingly severe is likely to impress all the parties concerned in a considerable degree.

Or take the case of mother stealing bread for their children in a famine. Perhaps it is not irrational in itself to hold the 1000 mothers accountable; but it is certainly much more rational to retaliate on those who, by neglecting precautions or remedies, are responsible for the famine. Indeed, we shall see that it is just this question of attaching responsibility to the right agents and to the right acts, in the right proportion, that constitutes the main interest in the discussion of responsibility.
Introduction to "The Logic of the Historical Sciences"

"The Logic of the Historical Sciences" also strongly indicates Gomperz' scientific interests. It too shows the influence of the findings of Gomperz' contemporaries about quantum theory. In this brief piece, Gomperz suggests that the underlying rule for formulating theories to explain historical events, simplicity, may be equated with the underlying rule for formulating scientific theories, relative frequency. His major argument is that experience has shown that a simple theory is more often correct than a complex one to explain the same facts. And "more often correct" is the same thing as "relative frequency of correctness."

In this way, at least, Gomperz helps to offset a problem which science faces in trying to explain natural phenomena: the problem that its methods must vary depending upon its particular subject matter and its approach. Gomperz observes that scientific monism, like other monisms, often is forced to introduce plurality to deal with the facts of literature or history. But the criterion of "relative frequency" is one method of science that is applicable to the phenomena of history as well.

The Logic of the Historical Sciences

The trouble with monisms is that they have to reintroduce duality (or plurality) in order to account for
the difference of their subdivisions of their fields. Spinoza, having asserted the unity of substance, had at once to admit the duals of its attributes. Scientific monism will not escape the same predicament. In some way or another it must recognise the plurality of the sciences, division of labor and specialisation being empirical facts. Now here it is confronted with a dilemma. It may attempt to explain these facts by emphasising either the differences of subject matter or those of method. The adoption of the former alternative would seem more favorable to the viewpoint of scientific monism: if it were only the subject-matters that differed, might not the methods be supposed to be essentially the same throughout the entire realm of science? Unfortunately such a position would be untenable for two reasons. On the one hand, in many cases the identity of the facts considered by different sciences is quite manifest: the movements of soldiers in a battle may be of interest to physiology, to tactics or to history. On the other hand, even if we at first stressed the differences of subject-matter only, this would itself entail a difference of method likewise, just as in sculpture, wood has to be carved, marble to be hewn and bronze to be cast. Indeed, in this respect science may be likened to behavior. Speaking very generally all behavior is one: whatever it may be concerned with, an animal can but move. But that does not imply that it may not move differently
when chasing its prey and when suing for a mate. So science too, ultimately, must always combine reasoning and observation, but it does not follow that it must use the same approach when dealing with different objects. Therefore, in attempting to define the proper field of history, we must be prepared to meet differences of method as well as differences of material.

The Field of History

I. Past
II. Past events referring to one and the same object
III. Past behavior of men
   (1) Past events referring to one and the same individual (biography)
   (2) Changing types of human behavior (history of civilization)
   (3) Changing types of structures abstracted from human behavior (tragedies, as distinguished from their productions on the stage); or of products of such behavior (houses); both of these subfields overlap: tragedies are products of the poet's behavior, but also structures in the above sense; in no case can a house be viewed simply as a type of object, since it is not defined by its material or form, but solely by its function of housing, which it shares with tents and dens
Past events referring to institution, i.e. to social structures (empires, churches, law courts, universities, systems of philosophy), as distinguished from thoughtmaking processes by which they are excogitated, believed in, and approved of. These are not types, because they are concrete (the "state" and the "war" are types, since there is but one Roman empire, and but one 30 years' war) nor abstract structures (for the same reason). They consist of concrete elements selected with regard to their functions (as means to definite ends).

(5) Changing types of structures abstracted from the function of institutions (history of law or dogma).

**Historical Probability**

Dr. Isabel Oread said the other evening that probability with reference to historical viz. particular events meant something quite different from what it means in science, namely relative frequency.

The first answer that suggests itself is that in history it means GREATER SIMPLICITY of an assumption only, whereas in science sometimes it means just this also, but sometimes relative frequency.
The next problem would be whether "greater simplicity" may not be in some way or other reduced to relative frequency? (Even if it could not both might be said to be closely related to each other in that they incline us to believe an assumption; but just why is this the case?) Such a reduction manifestly seems to presuppose the validity of a general rule: the simpler assumptions are more often found to be correct than the more complex or involved ones. Now the historian who so often is disappointed in the expectation of seeing the simplest assumption verified might feel inclined to doubt this. However his doubt seems likely to dwindle when he remembers the most common and trivial instances. Will he not fare better, on an average and in the long run, if he accounts for people telling him that they have caught cold, or that they were born in Minnesota, or that they love a certain woman, by assuming that these things really are as they are stated to be, than by assuming that the statements are all of them intentionally or unintentionally false? It would seem, then, that the simple may indeed be reduced to the relatively frequent only by the intervention of the above rule.

An important objection, however, may be raised. Would the assumption that all statements are wrong really be more complex, in a logical sense would it imply a greater number of assumptions? It would, indeed, if the
assumption were tacitly retained that we must adduce a PARTICULAR REASON for each particular mistake or falsehood, whereas the central rule that people ordinarily speak the truth had to be admitted as a satisfactory ground for the opposition assumption. But is this way of stating the problem really justified from a logical point of view? Would the general rule that people mostly say what is false not be AS SIMPLE as its opposite? It would appear, then, that at least in many cases, and perhaps even in the case most important for historians, WHAT WE STYLE SIMPLICITY IN TRUTH TACITLY IMPLIES GREATER RELATIVE FREQUENCY.

Let us illustrate this by an example. The genuineness of a Platonic dialogue has been doubted. Now having refuted the arguments on which the doubt was based I say: all the objections being removed, isn't it SIMPLER to suppose the dialogue to be genuine? But is it not "simpler" just because attributions are supposed to be more frequently correct than incorrect? Or to give another and somewhat different example. Why do we consider it to be the "simpler" hypothesis that the Iliad was composed by "Homer" than, as Mark Twain's schoolboy stated it, "by another poet of the same name?" Someone might say: because in the latter cases we should have to have TWO ASSUMPTIONS, viz. (1) The Iliad was written by a poet called Homer; and (2) there were two poets of the name of
Homer at the same time. But does not the allegedly "simpler" assumption in truth also involve a second assumption, viz.: "And this poet Homer was the only poet of that name living at the time?" And is this LOGICALLY in any way less complex than the other one?

It seems to me, then, that in very many cases (I do not know whether in all) the greater "simplicity" of an assumption is only an apparent one, due to the fact that ALL THE ASSUMPTIONS IMPLIED BY ONE ALTERNATIVE ARE EXPLICITLY STATED, because referring to facts infrequent and therefore needing emphasis, whereas those involved in the rival alternative are IMPLICITLY PRESUPPOSED, because FREQUENT and common and therefore not deemed worth mention. SOME REMARKS REFERRING TO "CHANGING TYPES OF CIVILISATION" (no. 2 of the above enumeration)

(1) If we consider one particular type (matrimony among the Babylonians), it appears to possess a medium degree of generality, being much more restricted in time than the types of paleontology.

(2) Every particular fact of history has a double significance: besides its value AS a particular fact, it also shows THAT SUCH A FACT WAS POSSIBLE at the time and under the conditions in question.

(3) This inference presupposes two truths: (a) a certain degree of uniformity among men (else the possibility might be confined to this particular individual,
without having any general significance). This must be empirically established or verified, but does not seem to differ on principle from a similar assumption in science (viz. that what holds good for one particle of a substance, will hold good for others also). (b) that the facts known to us are not a collection of exceptions—an assumption based on probability, that is to say on a supposed experience, which, however, seems to admit of rather numerous exceptions.

Introduction to "Racialism and Philosophy" and the "Letter to Professor Sisson"

The last three pieces considered in this chapter concern social and political philosophy. The main value of the first two, "Racialism and Philosophy" and the "Letter to Professor Sisson," is to show Gomperz' unswerving objectivity. His fair-mindedness in examining the basic assumptions upon which National Socialist ideology was based is impressive.

Because "Racialism and Philosophy" is intended for a general audience, Gomperz does not go into nearly as much technical detail to explain the basis for his beliefs as he does in his letter to Professor Sisson. But the lack of technical detail is compensated for by the fluid style characteristic of all his public lectures, which enables him to state the problem with admirable clearness. In the "Letter to Professor Sisson,"¹ on the other hand, Gomperz'
analysis is both more abstract and more detailed, though it is only about one-fourth as long. Here Gomperz sees the problem of the individual versus the state in the larger frame of the parts versus the whole, and he views the conditions under which a person acts individually or as a segment of the state in more subtle terms than he does in "Racialism and Philosophy." Another interesting feature of the "Letter to Professor Sisson" is Gomperz' concern with the diminishing importance of the individual in the technologically advanced industrial state. This concern with the problems of racialism and technocracy has preserved the pertinence of these two essays. They speak to us perhaps even more forcefully than they did to their original audiences, since the problems with which they are concerned have reached greater proportions.

Racialism and Philosophy

It has been well said that philosophy is not so much a science by itself, but rather an attempt to clarify the conceptions of other sciences. Only whereas, when you clarify a liquid, it mostly becomes clearer, I am afraid that, when you try to clarify conceptions, they often become more obscure still. Nor is this always the fault of philosophy; because when a subject is obscure in itself, clarification can only end in bringing out its obscurity more clearly. And I rather suspect, that just this may be
your impression when I shall sit down today.

This could hardly be the case if I intended to speak for or against the new German racialism; but that is not what I propose to do. I approach the subject with an unbiased mind, in an attitude of analysis and research. It is perhaps not a natural, and not even an easy attitude to keep up with regard to this issue, since the lives and the sufferings of hundreds of thousands of men and women are involved in it. Yet it seems to me to be the attitude characteristic of a philosopher as such. What, then, is it that I am aiming at in this talk? I should wish to set you thinking about the matter, and to show that it is not as simple as the adherents as well as the opponents of the new doctrine generally suppose, but that the problem is a very complex and obscure one, indeed.

When I say "the problem", I refer to the problem of racialism in general, not to the particular case most conspicuous at present, viz. the attitude of National Socialist Germany towards the Jews. But I do not mean to imply that if we considered this particular question, it would turn out to be in any way more clear or simple. The Jewish leaf in the ledger of the German nation is closely covered with entries, of debit as well as of credit. Anyhow, it is not this special problem, but the general principle on which Germany is trying to solve it that I propose to consider today. What, then, is that principle?
Obscurity would turn out at once to be hopeless, if I proceeded, as reason would seem to demand, and began by asking what the term race was meant to stand for, and how its connotation differed from that of the word nation. Indeed, if we tried to follow this line of argument, we should have to stop short very soon. To avoid this, let us suppose that we know all about the matter when we know 1) that race is meant to stand for something hereditary, for a communion of blood, and not of language, and of soil, that is to say of residence from time immemorial, and not of culture or civilization, and 2) that the whole theory has been excogitated mainly in order to prove that Jews can never be Germans, even when they have lived in Germany for hundreds of years and have, for a century perhaps, taken their full part in the intellectual, moral and spiritual life of the German nation. Now, what is the doctrine that centers in this conception of race, and which may therefore be called Racialism? It is contended that the descendants of one race cannot really enter into a communion of culture with those of another, because they differ from each other spiritually no less than physically: that this difference of "race-soul" is fundamental and indelible, just in the same way as differences in the color of the skin, or in the shape of the skull; that, therefore, it can, even by identity of environment and training, perhaps be slightly attenuated, but never entirely removed;
that, to mix the blood of one race with that of another, only means to adulterate it; and that cultural communion between them necessarily leads to the disintegration of their spiritual attitude and of their moral character. In a country, therefore, in which two or more races live, interspersed with each other, no course remains open but that of cultural isolation. Which practically means that, in Germany, marriage between Germans and Jews is forbidden, and even love is criminal; Jews are not citizens, and have no franchise; they may not be state officials, and are exempted from military service. They must, as far as possible, send their children to Jewish schools; they must have their own periodicals, their own theatres, and their own concerts. Germans are not allowed to consult a Jewish attorney or a Jewish physician; they are precluded from seeing plays written or acted by Jews, as also from hearing music composed or performed by artists of that race, since all these are relegated to the Jewish theatres and concerts, which Germans are strictly forbidden to visit: the circulation of books written by Jews is very restricted, in many scientific periodicals contributions of Jews are not accepted, no Jew may publish an article in a newspaper, save those reserved to Jewish subscribers; and if you aspire to edit a German newspaper, you must prove that there was no Jew among your ancestors as far back as the year 1800!
We are, I suppose, all of us likely to stand aghast when we hear of these things. Indeed, if the doctrine of "blood and soil" were put into practice in America, absolute confusion, nay, chaos itself, would ensue. America is a nation in the making, and it is made just by throwing men and women of more than one race into the melting-pot and by settling them on a soil that has never been their own ......

But then, is there not a race-question in America also? And is not the method of cultural isolation, so consistently - and perhaps we might say pedantically - followed in Germany, to some extent practiced here too?....

Now, the view of common sense will probably be that in this matter all depends on the degree of dissimilarity obtaining between two races. Precautions, it is likely to say, that may be perfectly legitimate in order to impede the physical and cultural fusion of two races of different color, may be completely absurd when applied to two races of the same color. And it will add, probably, that just because white people have a common interest in preserving their type and their culture against the invasion of colored races, they ought to live in peaceful communion with each other. And, certainly, common sense may be perfectly right in urging this consideration. Only, philosophy and common sense are two rather different things. The common sense-theory reduces the whole problem to a
question of degree. Now, philosophy has a certain bias against such a solution, that tends to blunt the pungency of the problem. At least, it greatly prefers very general considerations, and certainly there is an abundance of such also, suggested by the problem of races.

In the first place, I must remind you that the common sense-theory is only a mean between two extreme theories, both of them forcibly advocated even in our own day. One of them is the new racialism just outlined. The other is the old humanitarian theory which holds that "man is man", and that, as to all questions of a cultural, moral and spiritual nature, even the difference of color is only a superficial one, easily overbalanced by identity of training, of education and of social position. - Now, this doctrine seems, nowadays, to be advocated mostly by socialists and communists, who maintain that it is, more than any other thing, his work and his class that forms a man's character, and that, therefore, a white capitalist is more like a yellow capitalist than like a white day-laborer, and, again, that a negro-worker is more like a white one than like a negro employer. But let us not forget that this humanitarian theory was originally just the theory of religion. We may even trace it back to the ancient Greek and Indian doctrine of Re-incarnation. The soul of one man, it was believed, might, after his death, leave his body and enter that of any newborn child, and,
indeed, even that of a newborn animal. That there might be differences of soul corresponding to those of body, and that the soul that had animated one body might be unfit to animate another likewise - this difficulty was not even thought of. Nor was it taken much notice of by Christians, who held that God had created all souls alike and without any regard to the bodies in which He might be pleased to locate them. Indeed, this did not seem to imply any problem at all, since Soul and Body were supposed to have nothing in common. And this conception was not very profoundly modified in 18th-century humanism, most forcibly perhaps represented by our great German classic HERDER. And it was from this very source that 19th-century liberalism derived its inspiration. All men, so it was believed, were only different expressions of the one concept of humanity. They are all born alike, inasmuch as they are all equal in their dispositions and in their capacity for development, and therefore, on principle, in rights also. Only, some are poor and ignorant, and therefore in need of instruction and training. It is these that we style savages. To some extent, the whole British Empire is built upon this supposition. All peoples are alike at bottom; only, some of them lack education. Therefore, sooner or later, they ought all of them to have houses of parliament, a house of commons at any rate, and, as far as possible, a house of Lords also. Indeed, the
response of the savages has, in part, been very eager. They suppose that they are entitled to all the rights and privileges of an American citizen, because they have learnt to play base-ball, and I am not even sure whether there may not be peoples somewhere that aspire to the franchise before having ceased to devour each other on solemn occasions. And here is Kemal Pascha supposing that his Turks will be just like Frenchmen because he has forced them to wear a hat instead of a fez and to permit their wives to paint their lips and their eyebrows.

Now, it is this view that is breaking down before our eyes, and with which we ought, perhaps, to compare the new racialism, if we wish to judge it fairly. For, judging it from this point of view, we can hardly deny that, to some extent at least, it implies an approach to modern scientific views. As to the nature of the soul and of its union with body, opinions differ as widely as ever; but their close connexion and correspondence is a fact, undisputable and undisputed. We always knew, c. gr. that intoxication affects the one as it does the other; we know now that even in normal life elation and depression, sympathy and antipathy, depend on the function of the glands. And no scientist will hesitate to affirm that an efficient mind presupposes the integrity and normality of the cerebral functions. Indeed, modern psychology has become more and more behavioristic, that is to say, it
considers man as a living organism, and his conduct as a response of that organism to changing outward conditions - a response in which psychical and physical phenomena are blended, into indiscernible unity. Wherever, therefore, men differ perceptibly in their bodily frame, it is hardly conceivable that their brains should not - to some extent at least - differ also, and where these differ, it is utterly inconceivable that their souls should not differ too. Speaking generally, therefore, the notion that differences of race affect the soul likewise, must be considered as a tribute paid to modern scientific insight, so that racialism, even in its most one-sided and exaggerated form, must contain at least a modest nucleus of truth.

This does not, however, imply that intellectual, moral and spiritual differences must, in every single case, be as marked as the differences of bodily frame, and still less that those mental differences must necessarily involve differences of value. A pear is not an apple, and a duck is not a goose: but can we therefore tell which of these is "better", or more "highly developed"? Nor is it any way evident that offspring in whose blood that of two different races has come to mingle must necessarily be inferior to their ancestors. And if it may indeed be probable that education and training will not be able entirely to over-balance an inherited difference of dispositions and capacities, yet the extent to which, and the degree in
which, this may be achieved, can not possibly be settled by a priori speculation. Indeed, to all practical intents and purposes, the question last mentioned is by far the most important, viz. the question referring to the comparative significance of heredity on the one side, and of education on the other; and the only way to settle it definitely and finally would be to test it by experience; and this, again, could only be done by persistent research, viz. by sifting a vast mass of facts in a spirit free from all prejudice and from all bias. In other words, the problem of races is, in its very essence, a scientific problem, and it is, indeed, a singular phenomenon, perhaps unprecedented in the history of mankind, that the rashly anticipated answer to a scientific question should have become an article of faith and the basis of a political scheme. Envisaged from this point of view, the present race-policy of Germany would seem, indeed, to be utterly absurd.

It must, however, in fairness be admitted that action can not always wait for the solutions of science. Science moves slowly, whereas action must be taken here and now. It might, indeed, be suggested that, as long as we do not know what the right thing to do is, we ought not to do anything. Yet this also is not always feasible. For unwarranted omission may, in its consequences, prove to be as pernicious as unwarranted action. About the
safest treatment of a disease, doctors will often disagree; but the physician at the sick man's bed must act somehow, and if he does nothing, he may thereby endanger the patient's life as much as if he had done the wrong thing. And this consideration will refer to the question of races likewise. A man sincerely convinced that unimpeded blood-mixture and unchecked cultural communion is conducive to the physical deterioration and the moral decay of his race can hardly be expected to refrain from taking action, only because the final results of scientific investigation are not yet forthcoming, and will probably not be so for a long time to come. What then? We can hardly ever blame a man who is prompted to action by genuine conviction. But if he may be, to some extent, morally warranted in anticipating the final verdict of science by his action, we, too, may be warranted in anticipating it by our criticism. And so I may perhaps be permitted, in concluding, to say a few words about my own view of the matter.

I think it highly probable that differences of race imply considerable mental differences, that have been overlooked or gravely underrated by liberals, and are still erroneously ignored by socialists and communists. The plants differ as the seeds, and the birds as the eggs. Exposed, when still young, to similar influences, they may indeed vary in one and the same direction, but the differences in their organisation do not therefore dis-
appear. Moreover, we see strange effects of heredity that cannot possibly be explained by influences of environment only. I have known a boy, an illegitimate son, who had never known his father and did not even know who it /sic/ was. And yet, when grown to maturity, he developed the same averseness to question strangers, and even to ask his way, that had been characteristic of his parent. The English revel in hearing music; how is it that ever a composer of any distinction has sprung from that nation?

On the other hand, experience seems amply to show that men of nearly all races can, by adequate training, be raised to the level of average achievement. In Palestine, Jews have returned to the soil, which they had abandoned for near 2000 years: and in America negroes have become professors. For the highest achievements in the several departments of human activity different races seem indeed to be gifted in a somewhat different measure. The percentage of Jews among the best of chess-players, is very markedly above the average. But then, to breed champions, can hardly be the aim of politics.

Finally, to say that races differ is not tantamount to saying that they differ in value. I should think that, as a rule, external conditions being equal, they do not. On the whole, the truly indelible differences of the race-soul appear to me to be, indeed, very profound, but also very subtle, and very rarely to coincide with differences
of Better and Worse. Men of different races, similarly trained, do things differently, but they do the same things, and they may do them equally well. There are poets in one race, and in the other, but poets of a different inspiration. Homer is profoundly Greek, and Shakespeare is profoundly English, but who can say, which of them is greater? The Tao-te-king is profoundly Chinese, the Upanishads profoundly Indian, and the Old Testament is profoundly Hebrew, but who can say, which of those sacred books is superior to the others? - After all, even the old humanitarian view may contain a nucleus of truth!

University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California
May 1, 1936

Letter to Professor Sisson

3919½ Dalton Ave.
Los Angeles (Cal.)
April 27th, 1940

Dear Professor Sisson,

I thank you very cordially for your kind letter of the 22th /sic/ instant and for the reprint sent at the same time.

It was extremely kind of you to forward my letter to President Keezer. I heard a few days ago that there was, or had been, an opening at Reed College and wonder whether their needs could in any way be made to coincide
I have read with the greatest interest what you said in your presidential address and was very much struck and almost moved by the candor and seriousness of your presentation. Since you invite me to give you some comment on the topic of your address, I take the liberty of hazarding the following remarks.

To begin with an issue of comparatively minor importance, I am not absolutely sure whether you are entirely fair in your view of National Socialist ideology (to which, however, I am afraid their practices do not always conform):

(1) I do not think that they would agree to the assumption that the STATE is the ultimate subject of historical development. They would probably contend that this is true rather of the PEOPLE, or the NATION, or even the RACE. In any case, including those Germans who live outside the Reich and are not its citizens, but excluding those citizens of the Reich who are not Germans.

(2) It seems doubtful whether it is quite fair to contend, without qualification, that according to this ideology the individual has no independent significance or value whatsoever. Their view would rather seem to be that the individual has significance and value in so far only as it fills a specific position within the nation and assumes specific responsibilities. Theoretically, the nation
constitutes a hierarchy of individual functions and responsibilities (leader; sub-leader; sectional leader; follower—all of these either in the army, or in economy, or in administration) and that the individual has greater significance and value, in proportion as he identifies himself more or less with the specific functions and responsibilities assigned to him by the leadership.

(3) Nor should I venture to contend, without some gains of salt, that modern totalitarianism is in all respects undemocratic. It seems to me that there is a democratic trend within totalitarianism from two angles:

(a) The totalitarian ideology is definitely hostile to all privileges of birth and wealth; aristocracy and plutocracy are both assailed: any German as such is as valuable as any other German as such; the only essential difference is based on the greater or lesser degree to which the individual identifies himself with the interest of the entire nation and with the functions and responsibilities that he must assume in the interest of the nation as a whole.

(b) Totalitarianism claims to be government "by consent of the governed". That is just what makes life there so unbearable. The average citizen is not left alone. The leaders cater for his adherence and endorsement. They want to MAKE him endorse, hail and acclaim every measure. That is exactly why propaganda plays so enormous
a role. The individual is perpetually addressed and instructed and is expected to respond by enthusiastic consent. It is his duty, not simply to acquiesce, but to take part in assemblies and demonstrations, to hoist the swastika flag, to acclaim the leader and to vote for him on election day. You need but compare this mentality with that of old-fashioned absolutism in order to realize the enormous difference. And, curiously enough, it is the old-fashioned system which was truly oligarchic; the new system is much MORE democratic and, in proportion, it is also much worse.

Turning now to the problem in its more general aspects, I should say that the issue whether the individual or the group is more fundamental is rather idle. In spite of all the noise made by the "holists" or "wholeists", we know perfectly well that a whole X is: it is the totality of the parts AND OF ALL THE RELATIONS obtaining between them. A house is not the sums of the bricks CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION (which would mean a formless heap); but neither is it something BESIDE the bricks and their mutual spatial relations. In the same way a nation or state is not a sum of all the citizens ABSTRACTION BEING MADE from all their feelings of sympathy, solidarity, superiority, and inferiority, trust and distrust, their mutual dependence, rivalry, patriotism, their traditions, their readiness to recognize authorities, etc. etc. but neither is it some-
thing mystical APART FROM all the citizens and all their above-mentioned feelings and dispositions.

Whether the greater emphasis is to be laid on the group or on the individual, depends on the functions and achievements considered. A group cannot produce a tragedy; an individual cannot pierce a hill and construct a tunnel.

Now, which of these viewpoints stands out more obviously and imperatively, depends largely on the stage of technical and consequently of economic development. In an age in which a man lives—at least to SOME extent—in a state of economic self-sufficiency, it is individuals who occupy the focus of our field of vision; in an age of technical and consequently of economic concentration like ours the group will naturally come to the foreground.

Unfortunately, such concentration encroaches on the spiritual freedom of the individual in at least two different ways.

(a) It becomes more and more difficult for the individual even to express his thoughts by himself. The Bill of Rights guarantees him this freedom. But practically this means very little. He may still step forth in to the Central Square and address 50 bystanders from a stump. But in order really to propagate his views he needs the public press or the public broadcast and the use of both presupposes the contributions of a large group if he does not happen to possess exceptional wealth.
(b) What is worse, as soon as production is concentrated, the individual loses his economic independence AND WITH IT HIS SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE AS WELL. Whether his employer be a corporation or the state, after a time they are pretty sure to succumb to the temptation of abusing their power for the purpose of exercising pressure and an average man is not a hero. We have had ample experience of this in Europe. As soon as a man begins to be afraid of losing his job (as a civil servant or a teacher, as an industrialist, or as a worker, working for the state), he mostly yields, either more reluctantly or more indifferently, as the case may be. The starting points for such a development would seem to be clearly visible already in this country too. (Communists not to get public positions or to be excluded from receiving relief). (I have elaborated this point of view in an article "Cuius regio, illius opinio" in the International Journal of Ethics in 1937 of which I intended to send you a reprint; unfortunately, I see that I have no spare copy left).

As I see it, America appears to be confronted with the alternative of bearing with the virtual dictatorship of corporations or of replacing it with that of the state, as a consequence of progressively increasing state-interference. Without committing myself to this view I rather feel that the former might, after all, be preferable since
the plurality and consequently the rivalry of corporations might leave more scope for individual freedom than the monopoly of the state.

In the midst of these gloomy prospects I see but one faint ray of hope. Perhaps technical development will not always favor and entail concentration more and more. Traces of such a reversal may perhaps be descried in the growing significance of the automobile. Compared with the railway-train it is definitely MORE favorable to individual freedom. In a railway car you have to go when and where and as quick as the train moves; in your own car you may choose your own time and route and speed. Should analogous developments in other fields of technical development also gradually permit a growing self-sufficiency of the individual, then and then only we may perhaps look forward to a gradual decrease of collective pressure and a corresponding increase of personal freedom.

Yours very sincerely

H. Gomperz
Notes

¹Edward O. Sisson taught philosophy at Reed College from 1921 until 1939, when he became an Emeritus professor. Gomperz' letter refers to his presidential address at the 1939 meeting of the American Philosophical Association. The address was published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XIII (1939), 142-62.
CHAPTER IV

A PERSONAL NOTE

The two very short manuscripts in this concluding chapter are highly personal utterances; they are not meant to elucidate any profound problems in the history of philosophy. But the charm of "The Spiritual Climate of Vienna" and the arresting immediacy of "What I Do Not Believe" make these two of the most interesting essays to read. Perhaps that is because for just a few moments Gomperz opens a window facing inward towards himself, rather than exclusively outward towards the abstruse problems of philosophy, as he has done in so many of the essays included in this study. For the duration of these two pieces he lays aside the objectivity upon which he prided himself. And so we leave Gomperz, just as we met him in Chapter I, on a personal note.

The Spiritual Climate of Vienna

I. Three features of the climate

A. Leisure

1. Now it is the opposite--but there are still traces
2. Two anecdotes:
   a. Pole
   b. Park

B. The beautiful
   1. Modest aims--Money--life worth living
   2. Beauty
      a. Nature
      b. Sex
      c. Art
         (1) Stage
         (2) Music--Beethoven, Schubert

C. Humour
   1. Unheroic--common sense; criticism; humour; irony, half-heartedness, onconsistency
   2. Three instances
      a. Castelli
      b. Dalmatia
      c. And they again ....
   3. Even in extremities: two instances:
      a. "Of whom?"
      b. "Desparate, but not serious."

II. Conditions
   A. Residential city (1221; 1526; 1556; 1806; 1864).
      1. Nobles from Rhine, Bohemia, Hungary, Poland
      2. Officers from Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Croatia, Rumania; against Sweden, Prussia,
French and Turks.

3. Live on somebody
   a. Alms, tips, allowances
   b. Why given ("name"; rank and quality).

4. Titles. Student, doctor, counsellor, minister of state, Mylord, Mylady.--"Your Grace."

B. German city

1. Geographical--original function
2. Historical--capital of Germany (1556-1866)
3. Cultural
   a. Complaints
   b. Literature, philosophy and science.
4. Political. 1848; 1867; 1880; 1914; 1918; 1933
5. Mixed blood
   a. Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,Croats, Italians, Jews
   b. Music: Schubert, Johann Strauss; Hayden, Mozart, Bruckner; Beethoven, Brahms
   c. Half-heartedness
   d. Temperate nationalism
6. National struggle
7. Fanaticism of converts. Rieger, Gregor; Schmeykal, Krzepek.

C. Roman Catholic City

1. Vienna, Munich, Mayence /Mainz/, Cologne; Leipzig, Berlin, Hannover, Frankfort.
2. Catholicism different as are nations.
   Austrian Catholicism
   a. Comparatively tolerant; traces of 18th century
   b. Pliable--two anecdotes:
      (1) Lori Schwarzenberg
      (2) Salzburg

D. Wine drinking city
   1. Vienna; Munich
   2. Favorable to gracefulness and fine arts
   3. Munich again

E. Vienna and Berlin
   1. Rivalry--contempt--envy
   2. 1866; 1914
   3. Character of B (German City) present
   4. Spontaneity versus organization.
   5. Undercurrent not to be exaggerated.
      a. French flatteries not in good taste
      b. To make it the basis--or to erect it--would lead to disillusion

III. Vienna's historical function
   A. Outpost of German as equal to Western civilization
   B. Prevented this from being flooded. 1529; 1683.
   C. Sent out civil servants and officers, drew best elements to the center.
   D. Children not to be educated forever. 1918; 1919.
E. Future of what was left, forbidden ground. The medical sage of Carlsbad.

What I Do Not Believe

I. Because I do not believe in believing. Believing is of course natural, but science ought not to encourage it. In the mild climate of California believing too is found in mild and temperate forms. But once let loose, to what extremes will it go, and where will it stay? To believe is to behave as if we knew something to be true that we don't know to be true. That is what we must always do in acting. We believe what we do not know. But the proper office of science seems to be to point to the limits of our knowledge and to make us aware of our ignorance (Socrates). I do not overrate knowledge nor underrate belief. Belief is the predecessor of action. We never know the future beforehand. This is not a question of terms ("science"). against /?/ petty-prophets (M. Weber). Belief is not fit for university education. THERE OUGHT TO BE SOMEBODY TO POINT TO THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE.

II. I do not believe in pragmatism. Just because we know that knowledge foresakes us in action we only know expectations whether we acted well. Truth is correlated to looking backwards, not to looking forwards.

III. I do not believe in criticism and its limits of cognition fixed for all time to come (as far as it is
not a truism: what we cannot answer, we cannot answer). But I believe that there are limits at any given time and that we ought to be aware of them. Indeed,

IV. I do not believe in Logical Positivism saying that questions that cannot be answered (for the time being!) have no meaning (which is very much equal to criticism expressed in an unreasonable way). But it seems to me that, as long as we cannot answer then we ought not to pretend we can by a short-cut. What we don't know, we don't know. N.B.: To know that we cannot answer them we must know their meaning. And moreover we OUGHT to ask them in order to become aware of the limits. Nor can we leave this to the scientist, who—using the fundamental conceptions perpetually has no occasion to become aware of their problems and even mysterious character.

V. Yet I do not at all believe in scepticism. One opinion is not at all as good as another. I believe in scientific progress. Truth can be approached indefinitely, although never reached.

VI. Yet I do not believe in mysticism (although this, in a sense, is the only rational belief, because belief is equal to ignorance and mysticism is the only proper object of ignorance), since I do not believe in silently gazing at mysticism, but in dispelling it by science as far as possible. And moreover mysticism is the only belief resting on the basis of a specific experience,
although it may mostly be interpreted by mystics in a rather arbitrary way. Indeed, in so far, mysticism is rather a science than a belief, although mostly carried on in a rather unscientific (namely in a very dogmatic), fashion.

Indeed, science and mysticism supplement each other. The latter furnishes AWE, the former success. Just this gives the specific satisfaction of research—in history as well as in doctrine. (I appreciate Plato, but I never enter into his spirit entirely.)
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